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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k), which provides for this Court to hear appeals "transferred to the Court of
Appeals from the Supreme Court." The Utah Supreme Court poured over this case on
November 3, 1999.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Issue: Was partial summary judgment properly granted to Plaintiff Sole

Source Media, Inc. and Third-party Defendants Donald Junowich, William Morris, and
Kevin Stitt based on the Employment Contract, which governed Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff Brad Stewart's termination as an employee, and the Shareholders Agreement, which
allowed Sole Source to repurchase Stewart's shares in the corporation?
Standard of Review: Utah appellate courts, in reviewing a grant of
partial summary judgment, view the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below
and give no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, but review them for correctness.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989).
2.

Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Stewart's

motion to compel discovery of information relating to Sole Source's financial condition after
1994?
Standard of review: A denial of a Motion to Compel is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard. See Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 414 (Utah 1998).

3.

Issue: Did the trial court err in awarding attorney fees to Sole Source

in connection with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the parties' discovery
motions?
Standard of review: "Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action
is a question of law, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald,
961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). Nevertheless, "the trial court has 'broad discretion in
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, and [this Court] will consider that
determination against an abuse-of-discretion standard." Id
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES. AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules govern the issues in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action for breach of a non-compete agreement between Appellee
Sole Source Media, Inc. ("Sole Source") and Appellant Brad Stewart ("Stewart"). Stewart
was an officer, director, shareholder, and employee of Sole Source until November 4,1994,
when the other shareholders of the corporation, Donald Junowich ("Junowich"), William
Morris ("Morris"), and Kevin Stitt ("Stitt"), voted to terminate his employment with Sole

2

Source. The vote came after Stewart announced the intention to form his own corporation
and pursue business formerly held by Sole Source. Pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement
between Sole Source and Stewart, the corporation then exercised its option to repurchase
Stewart's shares. Stewart refused to return the shares arguing Sole Source tendered an
inadequate purchase price. Sole Source later filed a Complaint alleging breach of contract
on the part of Stewart.
Stewart answered with a Counterclaim and a Third-Party Complaint against
Junowich, Morris, and Stitt. During the ensuing litigation, both sides served written requests
for discovery.

Sole Source sought discovery of information relating to its Amended

Complaint and Stewart's Counterclaim, including documents which might show profits
Stewart earned through his competing company Prologic, Inc. ("Prologic") and also any
damages Stewart and/or Prologic may have suffered.

Stewart refused to produce the

discovery, but requested discovery from Sole Source relating to the corporation's and the
shareholders' financial status. Sole Source refused to produce information for time periods
after December 31, 1994. The parties both filed motions to compel and Sole Source also
filed a motion for protective order.
This appeal arises essentially from three (3) rulings by the trial court. The first
ruling granted partial summary judgment in favor of Sole Source and was memorialized in
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment and Order dated December 14,
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1998. The trial court concluded Stewart's employment had been properly terminated on
November 4, 1994, and that Sole Source had properly exercised the option to repurchase
Stewart's shares under the Shareholders Agreement. The trial court also concluded that the
"agreed value" was one dollar ($1.00) per share. Stewart's refusal to accept the purchase
price and return his shares to the corporation was a breach of the Shareholders Agreement.
The second ruling, contained in orders dated December 14, 1998 and April 26,
1999, granted Sole Source's Motion to Compel and its Motion for Protective Order, and
denied Stewart's Motion to Compel.
Third, the trial court concluded that Sole Source was the prevailing party in the
claims dismissed by summary judgment, and awarded attorney fees and costs for Sole
Source's defense of those claims to the extent they were based upon the Employment
Contract. The trial court also ruled that Stewart's Motion to Compel and defense of Sole
Source's discovery motions was not substantially justified, and awarded attorney fees to Sole
Source.
Course of Proceeding and Disposition Below
Sole Source filed a Complaint on or about October 24, 1995, and an Amended
Complaint on or about February 8,1996, alleging that Stewart had breached his non-compete
agreement with Sole Source. Stewartfileda Counterclaim against Sole Source and a Third-
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Party Complaint against Junowich, Morris, and Stitt which alleged the following causes of
action:
1.

Declaratory Relief;

2.

Dissolution for Oppression of Minority Shareholder;

3.

Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations and Economic

4.

Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing;

5.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty;

6.

Accounting and Judgment;

7.

Punitive Damages;

8.

Breach of Contract; and

9.

Indemnification.

Expectancies;

On or about March 3, 1998, Sole Source, Junowich, Morris, and Stitt filed a
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which sought dismissal of some of the claims in
Stewart's Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. The trial court ruled in favor of Sole
Source, concluding that Sole Source properly terminated Stewart's employment under the
Employment Contract and also properly exercised its repurchase option under the
Shareholders Agreement. The court dismissed Stewart's first, second, fourth, fifth, and
eighth causes of action entirely, and his sixth cause of action to the extent it was based upon
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events occurring after December 31, 1994. Sole Source sought and received an award of
attorney fees relating to the MPS J.
Sole Source also requested attorney fees for pursuing a Motion to Compel and
for defending against Stewart's Motion to Compel. Sole Source's Motion to Compel sought
discovery of tax, banking, and accounting information from Stewart and Prologic, and also
information about Stewart's competition with Sole Source during the relevant time period.
Stewart and Prologic refused to provide the requested information, arguing it was not
discoverable.
Stewart's Motion to Compel sought discovery of certain financial information
from Sole Source. Sole Source refused to produce some of this information because
Stewart's status as a shareholder ended December 31,1994 and he had no standing to request
documents or information after that time.
The trial court heard arguments on all of these motions on July 1, 1998. The
court issued a ruling and ultimately entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
December 14,1998, granting the MPS J, granting Sole Source's Motion for Protective Order,
and denying Stewart's Motion to Compel. The parties agreed at the hearing to share
customer lists and then produce documents for customers common to both parties, which
resolved a small portion of Sole Source's Motion to Compel. The trial court granted Sole
Source's motion to that extent by its December 14, 1998 Judgment and Order. The trial
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court deferred ruling on the rest of Sole Source's Motion to Compel, suggesting that its
ruling on the other motions might help the parties resolve the remaining discovery issues.
However, the Court's later Order dated April 26, 1999 granted the remainder of Sole
Source's Motion to Compel.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sole Source Media, Inc.
1.

Sole Source was a Utah corporation in which Stewart, Junowich,

Morris, and Stitt were shareholders. Sole Source dissolved automatically by the terms of its
Articles of Incorporation on June 30, 1996. (See Addendum "H," Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dated December 14, 1998.) (R. 586.)
2.

Sole Source was a graphics management company which provided its

customers with a turnkey program of printing and graphic related services. (Amended
Complaint, U 1; R. 46.)
3.

Stewart was an officer, director, and shareholder of Sole Source. (See

Addendum "F," Affidavit of Kevin Stitt, % 3.) (R. 241.) (See Addendum "G," Affidavit of
William Morris, If 3.) (R. 246.)
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Stewart's Employment
4.

Stewart entered an Employment Contract with Sole Source dated

December 1, 1993 (the "Employment Contract"). (See Addendum UB," Employment
Contract.) (R. 282-92.) The term of the Employment Contract extended to June 30, 1996,
unless terminated previously according to its terms. (Id. at 1f 2.) (R. 282-83.)
5.

The Employment Contract provides that "Employee shall not, during

the term hereof, be interested directly or indirectly, in any manner, [as a] partner, officer,
stockholder, advisor, employee or in any other capacity in any other business of the type an
[sic] character of business engaged in by Employer, or any allied trade . . .." (Id. at % 5.)
(R. 284.)
6.

The Employment Contract provides that it may be terminated upon the

employee's breach of the agreement. If the employee
should engage in gainful employment with another employer
without the express written consent of Employer, or should
otherwise breach any of the terms of this agreement, Employer
may regard this agreement as materially breached by Employee,
Employer's obligation to make the payments herein shall cease,
and Employer may obtain relief in the amount of damages
suffered including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(A/.at1f9.e.) (R. 289.)
7.

The Employment Contract also provides that it may be terminated by

Employer upon thirty (30) days written notice to Employee. (Id. at % 9.d.) (R. 289.)
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Stewart's Competition and Termination
8.

In August 1994, Sole Source was notified by the Avery-Dennison

Company ("Avery") that Avery would hire Sole Source to be manager for a significant
project known as "Communique." However, after Avery delayed commencement of the
Communique project, Sole Source determined it could not continue as project manager.
(Morris Aff., ffi[ 4-5.) (R. 246.)
9.

At a meeting of the Sole Source shareholders on October 27, 1994, the

shareholders discussed discontinuing the Communique project and also discussed tenninating
the employment of Alane Anderson and Anthony Dato, employees who were the general
manager and lead coordinator of the Communique project for Sole Source. "Stewart stated
that if Sole Source did resign the Avery project, he might be interested in pursing it
individually." See Addendum "A," Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, ffif 23-25.
(R. 62.)
10.

After Junowich left the October 27 meeting, Stewart told Morris and

Stitt that he would not work with Junowich and suggested terminating Junowich. Over the
following weekend, Stewart told Morris and Stitt that he planned to open a new business with
Anderson to handle the Communique project. (Morris Aff, ffl[ 8-9; Stitt Aff, ffi[ 6-7.)
(R. 246, 242.)
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11.

On November 4, 1994, a meeting of Sole Source shareholders was held

with Junowich participating by telephone. Stewart attended the meeting which was held at
Sole Source's principal corporate office, and voiced no objection to the meeting being held
or to the shareholders considering agenda items without prior notice. (Stitt Aff., fflf 8-9.)
(R. 242.)
12.

The November 4 meeting was called to consider terminating Stewart

because he was forming a competing business. (Morris Aff., ^ 10; Stitt Aff., ^ 9.) (R. 247,
242.) The shareholders voted to terminate Stewart's employment as Vice President of Sole
Source. Junowich, Morris, and Stitt each voted in favor, and Stewart abstained. (R. 294-95.)
13.

Stewart now owns and operates Prologic which was established as a

competitor of Sole Source. (R. 54, 588.)
Shareholders Agreement and Repurchase Option
14.

All shareholders including Stewart also signed a Shareholders

Agreement dated July 1, 1993 (the "Shareholders Agreement"). See Addendum "C,"
Shareholders Agreement. (R. 271-80.) Paragraph 10(a) of the Shareholders Agreement gave
Sole Source an option to purchase all of Stewart's shares in the event his employment was
terminated "for any reason other than death . . .." (Id. at 1f 10(a).) (R. 275.)
15.

The Shareholders Agreement specifies the purchase price in the event

Sole Source exercises the option to repurchase shares, as follows:
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The Purchase Price shall be the "agreed value" determined in
accordance with subsection (b), subject to adjustment by the
independent certified public accountant then serving the
Corporation to reflect material events and changes in
circumstances occurring subsequent to the date on which the
agreed value was last fixed.
( M a t 1f 12(a).) (R. 277.)
16.

Paragraph 12(b) of the Shareholders Agreement defines "agreed value"

as follows:
Until changed as provided hereafter, the "agreed value" per
Share as of the date of this Agreement is one Dollar ($1). This
price has been agreed upon by the Corporation and the
Shareholders as representing the fair value per share.
(R. 278.)
17.

Paragraph 12(b) then provides that at the end of each year the

shareholders shall in writing reaffirm the "agreed value" or agree upon a new value. If
neither occurs, then the Agreement provides as follows:
In the event that the stockholders and the Corporation fail either
to reaffirm the value per share or agree upon a new value as of
the end of any fiscal year, the agreed value most recently fixed
shall, subject to adjustment pursuant to subsection (a), continue
in effect for all purposes.
(R. 278.)
18.

The shareholders of Sole Source did not reaffirm the agreed value or

agree upon a new value at the end of 1993 or at the end of 1994. (Stitt Aff., 1f 11.) (R. 242.)
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19.

The accountant serving Sole Source during 1993 and 1994 made no

adjustment in the agreed value per share. (Id at ^ 12.) (R. 242.)
20.

When Sole Source was formed and the Shareholders Agreement was

prepared, the shareholders agreed that the value of Sole Source stock should be $1.00 per
share in order to discourage a shareholder from leaving and starting a competing business.
(Morris Aff., U 11; Stitt Aff, \ 13.) (R. 247, 243.)
21.

By Notice dated December 5, 1994, sent to Stewart via certified mail,

Sole Source exercised its option under the Shareholders Agreement to purchase Stewart's
shares. The Notice tendered the sum of $1.00 per share as the purchase price. See
Addendum "D," Notice of Exercise of Option and Shareholders Action. (R. 297-98.)
22.

Stewart received the Notice and tender of purchase price but has failed

and refused to surrender the shares. (R. 66-67.)
Trial Court Proceedings
23.

Stewart's Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint alleged causes of

action for declaratory relief, dissolution for oppression of minority shareholder, interference
with contractual relations and economic expectancies, breach of covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, accounting and judgment, breach of contract, and
indemnification. (R. 53-80.)
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24.

Sole Source filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated

March 3, 1998. The trial court granted the Motion and dismissed Stewart's First, Second,
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth causes of actions entirely, and the Sixth cause of action to the
extent it was based upon events occurring after December 31, 1994. (See Addendum "J,"
Judgment and Order dated December 14, 1998.) (R. 597-98.)
25.

Sole Source filed a Motion to Compel dated March 19, 1998, seeking

to compel production of documents from Stewart. (R. 315-17.)
26.

Stewart filed his own Motion to Compel Production of Documents on

February 3, 1998. (R. 143-45.) In response to that Motion, Sole Source, Morris, Stitt, and
Junowich filed a Memorandum in Opposition dated February 12,1998 (R. 177-211), and also
a Motion for Protective Order dated February 13, 1998. (R. 212-15.)
27.

All of those Motions were fully briefed and argued to the trial court on

July 1, 1998 (R. 449), and again on November 17, 1998. At the November 17 hearing, the
trial court granted Sole Source's Motion for Protective Order and denied Stewart's Motion
to Compel. The trial court subsequently entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and a Judgment and Order on December 14, 1998, implementing those rulings. (R. 596-99.)
28.

After reserving its ruling for a time on Sole Source's Motion to Compel,

the trial court issued a ruling on April 12, 1999, granting the Motion, and entered an Order
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on April 26, 1999. (See Addendum "K," Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, dated
April 26, 1999.) (R. 620-23.)
29.

Sole Source, Junowich, Morris, and Stitt were awarded $8,394.85 in

attorney fees and $367.82 in costs, for a total of $8,762.67, for prevailing in the defense of
Stewart's claims related to the Employment Contract, and for successfully pursuing and
defending the discovery motions described above. (See Addendum "L," Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, dated July 13, 1999 (R. 711 -16) and Addendum "M," Order Awarding
Attorney Fees, dated July 13, 1999.) (R. 717-19.) The attorney fees were based upon the
number of hours worked and the respective rates charged as identified in the Affidavit of
Matthew C. Barneck,ffi[4-8. (See Addendum "N." (R. 649-55.) The costs incurred are
itemized in If 9 of the Affidavit. (R. 652-53.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Sole Source filed a Motion for Summary Disposition in the Utah Supreme
Court before the case was poured over to this Court. The basis for that Motion is that the
Orders appealed from are not final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and therefore this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. By Order dated November 1,
1999, the Utah Supreme Court deferred ruling on that Motion until further consideration of
the appeal.
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Sole Source properly terminated Stewart's employment with the corporation,
pursuant to the Employment Contract. Stewart himself acknowledged that his employment
was terminated as of November 4, 1994. No unanimous vote was required to terminate
Stewart's employment. The plain language of the Shareholders Agreement gave Sole Source
the right to repurchase Stewart's shares at the "agreed value" should his employment be
terminated for any reason other than death.
The vote to terminate Stewart's employment triggered Sole Source's repurchase
option. Under the Shareholders Agreement, the purchase price would be the "agreed value"
of one dollar ($1.00) per share unless the shareholders agreed to change the agreed value
within sixty days after each calendar year. If the shareholders failed to do so, the agreed
value of the stock would remain at one dollar. The Shareholders Agreement also provides
that the independent certified public accountant serving the corporation may adjust the agreed
value based upon subsequent material events and changes in circumstances.

The

unambiguous language of the Shareholders Agreement does not require an adjustment to the
value of the stock before exercise of the repurchase option. Rather, the agreement provides
that the agreed value may be adjusted to reflect material events and changes in circumstances.
The trial court properly awarded attorney fees to Sole Source based on its grant
of partial summary judgment in favor of Sole Source. The Employment Contract provides
for an attorney fee award to the successful party for any action filed in relation to that
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agreement. Although the Shareholders Agreement does not provide for an attorney fee
award, the trial court's ruling was based on the defense of claims related to the Employment
Contract. Moreover, the trial court's allocation of attorney fees was adequately supported
by the evidence and was properly based on the kind of legal work was performed, how much
of the work was reasonably necessary, whether the billing rate was consistent with local
billing rates, and if circumstances required the consideration of other factors.
The trial court also was within its sound discretion to award attorney fees to
Sole Source both for pursuing its Motion to Compel and defending against Stewart's Motion
to Compel. Rule 37(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that a trial court shall
award attorney fees to the prevailing party in a discovery dispute unless the trial court finds
that the motion or defense Was substantially justified or if justice requires otherwise. Sole
Source's motion sought discoverable material direcdy relevant to Sole Source's and Stewart's
claims based on the non-compete agreement, and Stewart's opposition to that motion was not
substantially justified.

Likewise, Stewart's Motion to Compel discovery of financial

information for time periods after 1994 was not substantially justified because Stewart's
status as a shareholder terminated as of December 31, 1994.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL BECAUSE
THE ORDERS APPEALED FROM ARE NOT FINAL UNDER
UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(b).
Appellees believe that the orders appealed from in this action are not final
under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The claims appealed factually
overlap the claims that remain in the trial court such that they are "based upon the same
operative facts ...." Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm., 814 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah
1991).

The facts and law supporting this argument are set forth in greater detail in

Appellees' Motion for Summary Disposition dated October 13, 1999 and the Memoranda
supporting that Motion. By Order dated November 1, 1999, the Utah Supreme Court
deferred ruling on the Motion until further consideration of this appeal. By Order dated
November 3, 1999, this matter was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.
This Court should now consider the issues framed in Appellees' Motion for
Summary Disposition at this stage of the appellate process. Accordingly, Appellees adopt
by reference the facts and law set forth in their Motion for Summary Disposition and
supporting Memoranda. For those reasons, the Court should dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
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POINT II
SOLE SOURCE PROPERLY TERMINATED STEWART'S EMPLOYMENT,
THUS TRIGGERING SOLE SOURCE'S REPURCHASE OPTION
UNDER THE SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT.
A.

Stewart's Termination,
Under the terms of the Employment Contract, a shareholder's employment

could be terminated if he "should engage in gainful employment with another employer
without the express written consent of Employer, or should otherwise breach any of the terms
of this agreement . . .." (Employment Contract, 1f9.e.) (R. 289.) Paragraph 5 of the
Employment Contract provides that "Employee shall not, during the term hereof, be
interested directly or indirectly, in any manner, [as a] partner, officer, stockholder, adviser,
employee or in any other capacity in any other business of the type an [sic] character of
business engaged in by Employer, or any allied trade . ..." {Id. at ^ 5.) (R. 284)
By announcing his intention to form a competing business to pursue the Avery
contract, Stewart breached paragraph 5 of the Employment Contract. It was undisputed that
Stewart intended to form a separate company to pursue the Avery contract if Sole Source
resigned from it, and that he in fact did form Prologic for that reason. The trial court's
finding to that effect was based upon Stewart's own statements in his Counterclaim and
Third-Party Complaint, ffif 23-25 (R. 62), and his Affidavit dated March 27, 1998, f 21.
(R. 388.) Those statements were consistent with the facts set forth in the Morris and Stitt
18

Affidavits (R. 241-42, 246-47), and the Minutes of the Sole Source Shareholders' meeting
dated November 4, 1994. (See Addendum "E," Meeting Minutes.) (R. 295.)
A shareholder's employment also could be terminated "on thirty (30) days
written notice to [the] Employee." (Employment Contract, % 9.d.) (R. 289.) Stewart was
given written notice of his termination on November 4, 1994. (R. 424.) Along with the
termination notice, Sole Source proposed a separation agreement which offered to pay
Stewart's salary for the thirty-day period. (R. 426.)
Stewart acknowledged his termination and the separation agreement in
subsequent writings, and specifically that he received the termination notice.

On

November 7, 1994, Stewart signed an agreement with Sole Source waiving the non-compete
clause of his Employment Contract "with regard to the Avery-Dennison account. . .." (R.
428-29.) The waiver is implicitly based upon the termination of Stewart's employment at
Sole Source. Stewart also sent a Memorandum to Sole Source dated December 12, 1994,
outlining certain financial issues "which require discussion and resolution, pursuant to my
termination from Sole Source."

(See Addendum "F," Memorandum to Sole Source

Shareholders, p. 1.) (emphasis added). (R. 431-32.) Finally, in an Affidavit of Brad Stewart
dated April 8, 1998, filed in the trial court in this action, Stewart acknowledges receiving the
termination notice on or about November 4, 1994. (R. 407-08.)
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These undisputed facts show that Stewart's employment was terminated as of
November 4, 1994, and that his termination satisfied both Paragraphs 9.e. and 9.d. of the
Employment Contract.
B.

Sole Source's Repurchase Option,
According to the Shareholders Agreement, Sole Source could exercise its

option to purchase the shares of any shareholder "[i]n the event of the termination of
employment of a Shareholder with the Corporation for any reason other than death
(Shareholders Agreement, ^ 10(a) (emphasis added).) (R. 275.) The repurchase option is not
conditioned upon Stewart's removal as an officer or director, but only upon his termination
of employment.
Stewart scarcely mentions the Employment Contract in his Brief and instead
spends the majority of his argument explaining that his removal as an officer and director was
done without unanimous consent. Nevertheless, the repurchase option was not triggered by
any action relating to Stewart's position as an officer or as a director of the corporation, but
by the termination of his employment. No unanimous vote was required to terminate
Stewart's employment. His termination was proper and Sole Source had the option to
repurchase Stewart's shares at the "agreed value" under the Shareholders Agreement.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE "AGREED
VALUE" OF STEWART'S SHARES WAS ONE DOLLAR.
Stewart does not dispute that Sole Source gave proper notice of its exercise of
the repurchase option, or that he received the notice and the tendered purchase price. Instead
he argues the tendered purchase price was incorrect and that the exercise was therefore
invalid.
Contrary to Stewart's argument, applicable Utah case law declares that when
the repurchase agreement contains a clear method for determining the purchase price,
exercise of the option terminates the employee's status as a shareholder. Davies v. Semloh
Hotel, Inc., et al.9 86 Utah 318, 44 P.2d 689, 690-91 (1935) (parties intended that title to
stock should pass to corporation upon employee's discharge); see also Taylor v. Daines, et
ai, 118 Utah 61, 218 P.2d 1069, 1072-73 (1950) (shareholder's equitable or beneficial
interest in stock passed to corporation upon exercise of option). Professor Fletcher's treatise
on corporations states the same rule:
The seller may be given the option to repurchase the
stock on specified terms. If those terms of the stock purchase
agreement are clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court
to enforce it as written.
Fletcher Cyclopedia on Corporations, § 5617, p. 388 (emphasis added). Such stock
repurchase agreements "may be specifically enforced." Id. at § 5617, p. 386.
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The case of Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 773 P.2d 834 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
does not support a different result in this case. The Court in Webb cites Davies v. Semloh
and Taylor v. Daines as good law. Id. at 838 n.2. In Webb, the repurchase option did not
fix a purchase price but instead provided that the parties would engage in an alternating
appraisal process to arrive at a price. Id. at 835-36. Accordingly, the Court concluded the
contract did not intend title to the shares to pass upon exercise of the option. Id. at 838-39.
The terms of the Shareholders Agreement in this case are clear and
unambiguous, and it was the trial court's duty to enforce the Agreement as written. Fletcher,
§5716. Paragraph 10(a) of the Shareholders Agreement clearly gives Sole Source the right
to repurchase Stewart's shares upon his termination "for any reason other than death."
(R. 275.) Paragraph 12 establishes the purchase price as the "agreed value" of $1.00 per
share "unless changed hereafter...." (Shareholders Agreement, % 12(a).) (R. 277.) This was
the price "agreed upon by the Corporation and the Shareholders as representing the fair value
per share." {Id. atf 12(b).) (R. 278.) The Shareholders Agreement provides that the "agreed
value" may be changed at the end of a fiscal year if (i) the shareholders agree upon a new
value or (ii) the value is adjusted by the independent certified public serving the corporation
"to reflect material events and changes in circumstances" occurring since the agreed value
was last fixed. {Id. atffif12(a), (b).) (R. 277-78.) If the agreed value is not so changed, then
the last agreed value shall "continue in effect for all purposes." {Id. at \ 12(b).) (R. 278.)
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It is undisputed that the Sole Source shareholders did not agree upon a new
value per share and that the value was never adjusted by the company's accountant. Thus,
the "agreed value" in December 1994 was $ 1.00 per share. The Notice of Exercise of Option
and Shareholders Action both recited and tendered the proper purchase price of $1.00 per
share. Stewart does not dispute that the last "agreed value" was $ 1.00 per share. Yet Stewart
admits that he refused to tender his shares to Sole Source only because he challenges the
tendered purchase price. On those undisputed facts, the trial court correctly enforced the
Shareholders Agreement and declared Stewart's status as shareholder terminated as of
December 31, 1994.
Stewart nevertheless contends adjustment of the agreed value by the accountant
was mandatory and not permissive.

He argues the words "subject to" required the

accountant to adjust the agreed value, rather than permitting an adjustment if circumstances
warranted it. Stewart's argument runs counter to the plain language of the agreement and the
intent of the parties. To ascertain the intent of the parties to a contract, courts first look to
the four corners of the agreement. Krauss v. Utah State DepL o/Transp., 852 P.2d 1014
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (overruled on other grounds). In so doing, the court must consider each
provision in relation to all the others. Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d
766, 770 (Utah 1995). The primary rule in contract interpretation is to determine what the
parties intended "by looking at the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other,
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giving an objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole." Sears v.
Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Utah 1982). When a written contract is unambiguous,
the intent of the parties can be determined from the words of the agreement and extrinsic
evidence is not considered. R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Ind, 936 P.2d 1068, 1074
(Utah 1997) (citing Black's Law Dictionary, 73 (5th ed. 1979)).
The intentions of the parties are clear from the face of the Shareholders
Agreement, and Stewart's arguments must fail. First, the Shareholders Agreement uses
mandatory language in several places in contrast to the words "subject to." For instance,
Paragraph 10 of the Agreement states that the corporation "shall have the option to purchase
all of the Shares owned by [a] Shareholder at his or her termination of employment."
(R. 275.) The Agreement also mandates that the purchase price "shall be determined"
according to Paragraph 12(a) and (b). (R. 277'-78.) Notice to any shareholder "shall be
personally delivered or mailed by registered or certified mail," (id. at U 16(a)), and the
Agreement "shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah." (Id at % 16(c).) (R. 279.)
The Shareholders Agreement easily could have used the word "shall" to create a mandatory
adjustment by the accountant, but instead it twice uses the words "subject to."1 This
*In support of his argument that the words "subject to" somehow invoke a condition
precedent, Stewart cites GRD Development Co., Inc. v. Foreca, SA., 747 S. W.2d 9 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988), and Ryiz v. Federal Insurance Co., 497 A.2d 1001 (Conn. Ct. App. 1985) as
persuasive authority. The cases hold that the words "subject to" may condition an event upon
the occurrence of a preceding event, but only in general terms. Thus, the GRD court stated
that "employment of such words as . . . 'subject to' usually indicate that a promise is not to
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contrasting language supports the trial court's conclusion that adjustment by the accountant
was permissive and not mandatory. The trial court thus correctly considered the provisions
at issue "in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring
none." Plateau Min. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) (citation
omitted).
Second, the Shareholders Agreement provides for an adjustment by the
accountant only "to reflect material events and changes in circumstances" occurring since the
agreed value was last fixed. (Shareholders Agreement, ^ 12(a).) (R. 277.) When Stewart was
terminated, the corporation was less than 18 months old. Even if the accountant had
reassessed the agreed value, there is no evidence that any "material events and changes in
circumstances" had occurred to support a different value. This language shows the parties
intended that no adjustment would occur if there were no such events or circumstances. No
shareholder—including Stewart—made a request for an adjustment of the agreed value at any
time before Sole Source exercised its option to repurchase Stewart's shares,2 which indicates

be performed, except upon a condition or happening of a stated event." Likewise, the Ryiz
court went only so far as to hold that "subject to" means "likely to be conditioned, affected,
or modified in some indicated way."
2

Stewart's contention that his request for an adjustment on December 12, 1994,
creates a disputed material fact is without merit. His request on that date is not a material
fact because it came after the repurchase option already had been exercised.
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that none of them believed any "material events and changes in circumstances" had occurred.
The agreed value, therefore, remained at one dollar ($1.00) per share.
Third, Stewart's argument that $330.00 did not adequately compensate him for
his share of the company (and therefore a mandatory adjustment must have been intended)
ignores the intent of the Shareholders Agreement as a whole. According to the Agreement,
the shareholders most likely would not receive a return on their investment through an
adjustment of the agreed value per share but instead would receive returns through quarterly
distributions. Paragraph 3 provides that all profits were to be distributed to the shareholders
and the company's practice was to distribute quarterly. For example, as stated in his opening
Brief, Stewart received his thirty-one percent (31%) share of the $234,000.00 profit earned
during the third quarter of 1994. Stewart actually earned many times his initial $10,000
investment, and his claim that "[i]t is simply unconscionable that [his] ownership interest in
the corporation he built from nothing could be stolen from him for a mere $330.00" is
disingenuous at best. (Brief of Appellant, p. 31.)
The trial court's ruling was not "harsh" or "inequitable," but reflects an
understanding that the Shareholders Agreement was designed to provide return through
quarterly distributions and to discourage shareholders from leaving the enterprise by
imposing a low one dollar ($1.00) agreed value. {See Morris Aff., If 11; Stitt Aff., \ 13.)
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(R. 247, 243.) There was no error in the trial court's conclusion that the agreed value per
share remained at one dollar when Sole Source exercised its option to repurchase.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY FEES TO SOLE SOURCE PURSUANT TO THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION.
A.

Summary judgment was granted based on the Employment
Contract and the Shareholders Agreement
Sole Source, Junowich, Morris, and Stitt moved for partial summary judgment

to dismiss several causes of action in Stewart's Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint.
As discussed above, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Sole
Source. Stewart's termination from Sole Source was governed by the Employment Contract
between Stewart and Sole Source, and the trial court relied on that agreement in reaching its
conclusion. The trial court's decision that the termination was proper necessarily preceded
its decision that the repurchase option was properly exercised. Because the Employment
Contract expressly provides for an award of attorney fees to a party who is successful in "any
action . . . filed in relation to" the Employment Contract, the trial court was well within its
discretion to award attorney fees to Sole Source.
Stewart correctly argues that attorney fees in Utah are generally only awarded
pursuant to a contract at issue or pursuant to an applicable statute. See Valcarce v.
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Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). 'Tees provided for by contract, moreover, are
allowed only in strict accordance with the terms of the contract." Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d
52, 54 (Utah 1998) (citing Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) and
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982)).
Stewart maintains, however, that the award was improper because the trial court's decision
was based solely on the Shareholders Agreement, which contains no attorney fee provision.
The argument is simply in error.
Sole Source, from the very beginning, asserted that the Employment Contract
was central to its Motion. In its opening Memorandum in the trial court, Sole Source alleged
the following:
4.
All shareholders including Stewart signed
a Shareholders Agreement dated July 1,1993 (the "Shareholders
Agreement") . . . . Paragraph 10(a) of the Shareholders
Agreement gave Sole Source an option to purchase all of
Stewart's shares in the event his employment was terminated
"for any reason other than death . . . ." [See Shareholders
Agreement, % 10(a).]
5.
Stewart also entered an Employment
Contract dated December 1, 1993 (the "Employment Contract")
. . . . The term of the Employment Contract extended to June 30,
1996, unless terminated previously according to its terms. [See
Employment Contract, ^ 2.]
6.
The Employment Contract provides that
"Employee shall not, during the term hereof, be interested
directly or indirectly, in any manner, [as a] partner, officer,
stockholder, adviser, employee or in any other capacity in any
other business of the type an [sic] character of business
engaged in by Employer, or any allied trade . . . . " [See
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Employment Contract, ^ 5.J The Employment Contract also
provides that it may be terminated upon an employee's breach
of the agreement. [See Employment Contract, ^ 9.e.]
(R. 256-57 (emphasis added).) Sole Source argued that, because Stewart had violated the
terms of the Employment Contract, his employment was terminated, and that termination
triggered the corporation's option to purchase Stewart's shares.
The trial court held in its Judgment and Order dated December 14, 1998, that
Stewart had an employment agreement with Sole Source, that the agreement conditioned
termination of employment on the employee's breach of that agreement, and that Stewart
indeed breached the agreement by starting a competitive business. (R. 596-99.) The Order
further states that "Stewart acknowledged '[his] termination from Sole Source.'" Id Six
months later, the trial court awarded attorney fees. The trial court found that Stewart's
"Counterclaim alleged certain causes of action based upon an Employment Contract dated
December 1,1993, between Defendant Brad K. Stewart... and Plaintiff Sole Source Media,
Inc. . . . , including claims for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." (R. 712.)
Thus, the Employment Contract was not only implicated by Sole Source's
Motion but also was relied upon by the trial court in making its ruling. Moreover, the
Employment Contract does not limit an award of attorney fees to a successful party to a
claim based strictly on the agreement itself. The agreement provides for attorney fees "[i]n
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the event that any action is filed in relation to this Contract" (Employment Contract, ^ 16
(emphasis added)). (R. 292.) Certainly, Stewart's claims for breach of contract, declaratory
judgment, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing—all of which
address Stewart's termination of employment—are an action filed "in relation to" the
Employment Contract. An award of attorney fees to Sole Source, therefore, was proper and
not an abuse of discretion.
B.

Allocation of fees

Stewart next argues the trial court did not properly allocate fees among the
claims on which Sole Source prevailed. "Whether attorney fees are recoverable" and
"whether the trial court's findings of fact" sufficiently support an award are questions of law,
reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 314 (Utah 1998).
Nevertheless, "the trial court has 'broad discretion in determining what constitutes a
reasonable fee, and [this Court considers] that determination against an abuse-of-discretion
standard.'" Id (quoting Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d985, 991 (Utah 1988)). The
reviewing court must uphold the trial court's award absent '"patent error or clear abuse of
discretion.'" Id. at 316 (quoting City Consumer Serv., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 240
(Utah 1991) (other citation and quotations marks omitted)).
The evidence in this case adequately supports the trial court's award. Counsel
for Sole Source provided the trial court with a Memorandum and Affidavit supporting the
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request for attorney fees. The Affidavit set forth in detail the amount of time spent and the
fees incurred in litigating the discovery issues and the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
(See Affidavit of Matthew Barneck.) (R. 649-55.)
Moreover, Sole Source recited in its supporting memorandum to the trial court
the standards announced in Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998), and Valcarce for
the proper method to evaluate a request for attorney fees. (R. 632.) In fact, Sole Source
urged the trial court, pursuant to Valcarce, to consider what type of legal work was
performed, how much of that work was reasonably necessary, whether the billing rate was
consistent with local billing rates, and if circumstances required the consideration of other
factors. (Id) Sole Source also recognized that a party seeking attorney fees "must allocate
its fee request according to the underlying claims, and must categorize the time and fees
expended for successful claims or claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees."
Memorandum (citing Foote, 962 P.2d at 55 and Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, et ai, 830 P.2d
266, 269-79 (Utah 1992)). (R. 632.) Counsel for Sole Source did so in his supporting
affidavit.
Sole Source also acknowledged that "Stewart's Counterclaim for breach of the
Employment Contract was intertwined with his claim for breach of the Shareholders
Agreement," and explained to the trial court that its "defense was in part based upon
interpretation of the Shareholders Agreement. Additionally, the Motion for Partial Summary

31

Judgment also sought the dismissal of Stewart's claims for breach of fiduciary duty (Fifth
Cause of Action) and for an accounting (Sixth Cause of Action)." (R. 634-35.)
Stewart also alleges Sole Source essentially conceded "that it should receive
only fifty percent of the fees incurred in bringing its Motion because the claims at issue also
involved the Shareholder Agreement," which does not provide for an attorney fee award.
(Brief of Appellant, p. 39.) Stewart's characterization is inaccurate. Without conceding that
an award of fees should be split, Sole Source requested "an award of at least fifty percent"
(R. 635) of the total fees incurred, leaving the determination of whether to allocate the award
and the appropriate percentage to the trial court. (Id)
C.

Sole Source is the successful party of this litigation.

"Where there was a right to attorney fees, Utah courts have allowed the party
who successfully prosecuted or defended against a claim to recover the fees attributable to
those claims on which the party was successful." Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v.
Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added). Accordingly, a court
should use "'a flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in particular cases who actually
is the prevailing party.'" Id (quoting Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d
551, 556 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
Stewart argues that because some issues relating to the Employment Contract
have yet to be resolved, Sole Source cannot be the "successful" or prevailing party for
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purposes of the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Although the claims alleged in Sole
Source's Amended Complaint have yet to be resolved, those claims were not the basis for
Sole Source's Motion. Instead, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment sought dismissal
of claims in Stewart's Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint against Sole Source,
Junowich, Morris, and Stitt. The trial court agreed with Sole Source and dismissed those
claims, and specifically concluded Sole Source was the successful party and Stewart was the
unsuccessful party. (R. 714.). An award of attorney fees pursuant to the Employment
Agreement was therefore justified,

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO SOLE SOURCE PURSUANT TO
THE DISCOVERY MOTIONS.
A trial court must, after granting a motion to compel, award attorney fees to
the moving party "unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially
justified" or if imposing the award would be unjust. Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). Rule 37 also
imposes an award of attorney fees to a party who successfully defends against a motion to
compel not "substantially justified." Id.
Although the Rule states that attorney fees "shall" be awarded to the prevailing
party, the trial court has discretion, upon finding that the motion or defense was substantially
justified, to refuse to make such an award. See Garrandv. Garrand, 581 P.2d 1012, 1014
33

(Utah 1978). Nevertheless, the Rule's language does more than give the court discretion in
awarding attorney fees. It also creates a presumption that an attorney fee award is appropriate
in order to encourage trial courts to impose the sanction.
"Whether a discovery motion is 'substantially justified' depends on the
particular facts of each case." Hutchinson v. Pfeil, No. 98-5043, 1999 WL 1015557 (10th
Cir. (Okla.) Nov. 9, 1999) (unpublished opinion). The facts of this case support the trial
court's decision to award attorney fees to Sole Source for its Motion to Compel and for
defending against Stewart's Motion to Compel.
A.

Sole Source's Motion to Compel

Although Sole Source and Stewart reached an agreement that Stewart would
produce a customer list for the purpose of determining common customers, the two parties
never agreed upon production of Prologic's financial information. In fact, the customer list
was only a small portion of the documents Sole Source requested. Sole Source also asked for
the following:
(1)

Prologic's financial documents, including copies of any
employment agreement reflecting gainful work by Stewart as an
employee or independent contractor other than with Sole Source
since January 1, 1994

(2)

Banking and accounting records and financial statements of
Prologic, Inc.

(3)

Tax returns, W-2 forms, and 1099 forms for Prologic and any
other entity owned by Stewart since 1990
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(4)

Copies of job files for customers of Prologic or Stewart "from
the formation of Prologic on January 1, 19994, whichever is
earlier, through December 31, 1995

(5)

Documents relating to work performed by Stewart or Prologic
on behalf of the Avery-Dennison Company from November 1,
1994, through the present

(R. 320-21.)
All of these requested documents contained information relevant to Sole
Source's claims based on the non-compete agreement. The measure of damages in Sole
Source's breach of contract and interference claims was based in part upon the amount of
money Stewart and/or Prologic earned in violation of the non-compete agreement. Moreover,
the information was also relevant to Stewart's claims for damages as asserted in his
Counterclaim and Third-party Complaint.
Documents relating to Stewart's employment since his termination from Sole
Source was also discoverable because Stewart had a contractual duty both during his
employment at Sole Source and for six months after his termination not to own or conduct
business in competition with Sole Source. Thus, Sole Source was entitled to know of any
other sources of gainful work in which Stewart was engaged during those e time periods.
The trial court was correct to award attorney fees to Sole Source. Both parties
had resolved a small portion of the discovery dispute, but Stewart still refused to produce a
large portion of the requested documents, even though it was plain that Sole Source's
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requests for these documents was "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). An attorney fee award was not an abuse of
discretion.
B.

Stewart's Motion to Compel

Stewart argues that his motion to compel production of Sole Source documents
was substantially justified because his status as a shareholder was unclear at the time he
made his requests. Stewart's argument misses the mark, however, because his requests for
documents from Sole Source were made "in an effort to determine, among other things, what
the value of the company was and where the assets of the company were transferred after his
termination." (Brief of Appellant, p. 45 (citing R. 146-58) (emphasis added)).
Essentially, Stewart sought to discover information relating to the "agreed
value" of his shares, not to his status as a shareholder. In fact, Stewart himself acknowledged
that his employment had been terminated, resulting in the exercise of the repurchase option
under the Shareholders Agreement. Absent clear status as a shareholder of Sole Source,
Stewart had no basis to pursue discovery relating to time periods after December 31, 1994,
because he "had ceased to be a shareholder at the time the action was commenced." T. Bjur
& K. Elkins, Fletcher Encyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 1286 (1993).3

3

Sole Source had already provided responsive documents through the end of 1994;
therefore, Stewart had enough relevant information to make his own independent analysis
of the share value, if necessary.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's decisions
relating to Sole Source's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and both parties' motions
to compel discovery. Partial summary judgment was appropriate because the undisputed
facts show Stewart breached his Employment Contract with Sole Source. Sole Source then
properly exercised its option to repurchase Stewart's shares in the corporation at the agreed
value of one dollar per share.
Once Stewart was terminated as an employee and the repurchase option was
properly exercised, his shareholder status ceased. Stewart therefore had no standing to seek
discovery of documents or information relating to the corporation's financial condition after
December 31, 1994. Stewart also had no substantial justification for defending against Sole
Source's Motion to Compel discovery of information that was reasonably calculated to lead
to admissible evidence. The information Sole Source sought was directly related not only
to Sole Source's claims but also to those Stewart alleged in his counterclaim. The trial court
was thus within its discretion to award attorney fees to Sole Source and did so based on a
detailed allocation of fees and in consideration of established standards. For the same
reasons, Appellees are entitled to an additional award of attorney fees if their defense of this
appeal is successful.
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Sole Source respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's rulings
in this matter.
DATED this

C/\ day of July, 2000.
2A
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

lew C. Barneck
Attorneys for Appellees
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ADDENDUM "A"

ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT.
COUNTERCLAIM. AND
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
Dated April 16,1996

X

JEFFREY L. SILVESTRINI (Bar No. 2959)
of and for
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff
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:
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(Q I

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-000O000—

SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah
corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,

ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT,
COUNTERCLAIM, AND THIRD-PARTY
COMPLAINT

PROLOGIC, a Utah partnership, Defendant
and BRAD STEWART Defendant, Counterclaimant and Third-Party Plaintiff,

Civil No. 950907433
Judge Glen Iwasaki

DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM MORRIS,
and KEVIN STITT,
Third-Party Defendants.
—oooOooo—
Defendant Prologic, a Utah partnership, and Defendant, Counterclaimant and ThirdParty Plaintiff Brad Stewart ("Stewart"), through their undersigned counsel, answer the Amended
Complaint of Plaintiff as follows:

answer.cou\cmb

n n r. r, Q

FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state claims against Defendants upon which relief may
be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
Responding to the specific allegations of the Amended Complaint ("Complaint"),
Defendants asserts as follows:
1.

Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the Complaint.

2.

Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, 17,

18, 19, 21 and 22 of the Complaint.
3.

In response to paragraph 2 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that Prologic

is a Utah partnership doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and admit that Prologic
employed Defendant Stewart during November 1994, following the purported termination of Stewart
as an employee of Plaintiff.
4.

In response to paragraph 3 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that Stewart

executed an Employment Contract with Plaintiff dated December 1, 1993, but deny that a copy of
the Employment Contract was attached to the Complaint served upon Defendants.
5.

In response to paragraph 4 of the Complaint, Defendants affirmatively assert

that the Employment Contract speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. Defendants
admit the allegations contained in paragraph 4 insofar as they are consistent with the provisions of
the Employment Contract.

answer.couVcmb

-2-

n n n KA

6.

In response to paragraph 5 of the Complaint, Defendants assert that the

Employment Contract speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. Defendants admit the
allegations contained in paragraph 5 insofar as they are consistent with the Employment Contract.
7.

In response to paragraph 6 of the Complaint, Defendants assert that the

Employment Contract speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. Defendants admit the
allegations contained in paragraph 6 insofar as they are consistent with the Employment Contract.
8.

In response to paragraph 7 of the Complaint, Defendants assert that the

Employment Contract speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. Defendants admit the
allegations contained in paragraph 7 insofar as they are consistent with the Employment Contract.
9.

In response to paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Defendants deny that Stewart

provided any notice prior to the time Stewart's employment with Plaintiff was purportedly
terminated. Further, on or about November 4, 1994, the only business Stewart contemplated
assuming in competition with Sole Source was the Avery contract, which Sole Source repudiated
during the course of meetings on November 4, 1994 and prior to the time Stewart indicated his
interest in individually pursuing the Avery contract. Defendants otherwise deny the allegations
contained in paragraph 8 of the Complaint.
10.

In response to paragraph 9 of the Complaint, Defendants deny that any formal

meeting of shareholders of Plaintiff was held on November 4, 1994, but admit that three of the four
shareholders were present for discussions and the fourth shareholder participated for a time by
telephone. Defendants deny that the grounds for termination discussed in the meeting on November
4, 1994 were Sections 6, 7, 8 or 9 of the Employment Contract. Defendants admit that Sole Source
provided Stewart with a waiver allowing him to establish a company to pursue business from Sole
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Source's customer, Avery. Defendants deny each and every other allegation contained in paragraph
9 not expressly admitted herein.
11.

In response to paragraph 10 of the Complaint, Defendants deny that they have

committed any acts in breach of the Employment Contract and deny that they have solicited or
accepted business from any Sole Source customers except those as to which express waivers were
provided, including Avery and Bonneville Communications. Defendants deny each and every other
allegation of paragraph 10 except as expressly admitted herein.
12.

In response to paragraphs 11, 16 and 20 of the Complaint, Defendants

reincorporate by reference their responses to the paragraphs Plaintiffs have realleged therein.
13.

Defendants deny each and every other allegation contained in the Complaint

not expressly admitted herein.
THIRD DEFENSE
The claims of Plaintiff are barred under the doctrine of waiver.
FOURTH DEFENSE
The claims of Plaintiff are barred under the doctrine of estoppel.
FIFTH DEFENSE
The claims of Plaintiff are barred under the doctrine of unclean hands.
SIXTH DEFENSE
The claims of Plaintiff are barred under the doctrine of release.
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SEVENTH DEFENSE
The claims of Plaintiff have not been asserted in good faith and are without merit and
Defendants are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in
defending Plaintiffs Complaint pursuant to the provisions of §78-27-56, U.C.A., 1953.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Defendant is entitled to an offset or set off against any amounts owed to Plaintiff by
virtue of the claims plead in Defendant's Counterclaim which is here incorporated by this reference.
NINTH DEFENSE
As a further and additional affirmative defense, Defendant affirmatively asserts the
matters asserted in the Counterclaim and Third-party Complaint which is here incorporated by this
reference.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray judgment against Plaintiff on its Complaint as
follows:
1.

That Plaintiff take nothing by way of its Complaint and that the same be

dismissed with prejudice.
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3.
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COUNTERCLAIM AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
For his Counterclaim against Sole Source Media, Inc. ("Sole Source") and ThirdParty Complaint against Third-Party Defendants Donald Junowich, William Morris and Kevin Stitt,
Counterclaimant and Third-Party Plaintiff Brad Stewart, alleges as follows:
1.

Sole Source is a Utah corporation in the business of graphics management.

Sole Source provides its customers a turn-key program of printing and graphic-related services.
2.

Defendant Donald Junowich ("Junowich") was at all relative times president,

shareholder and director of Sole Source and a resident of the State of California.

Defendant

Junowich has engaged in substantial contacts with the State of Utah such that jurisdiction is
appropriate over his person pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Long Arm Statute, §78-27-22 et
seq. U.C.A. 1953, or otherwise. Specifically, Junowich has transacted business with the State of
Utah, has caused injury in this state by tortious behavior as more particularly alleged herein and has
served as the president and director of Sole Source, a Utah corporation doing business in Utah.
Junowich originally filed this action as a party Plaintiff in the original Complaint filed herein dated
October 24, 1995 and thereby has invoked the benefits and protections of the State of Utah.
3.

Third-Party Defendant William Morris ("Morris") is a resident of the State

of Utah and at relevant times was an officer, shareholder and director of Plaintiff Sole Source.
4.

Third-Party Defendant Kevin Stitt ("Stitt") is a resident of the State of Utah

and at relevant times was an officer, shareholder and director of Plaintiff Sole Source.
5.

Sole Source was an enterprise founded in August 1992 by Brad Stewart,

originally as a sole proprietorship. Stewart established Sole Source to serve its customers by
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subcontracting printing services and project management to a network of printing vendors and
suppliers.
6.

Stewart operated the company himself until January 1993, when Junowich

joined the company. Stewart and Junowich had met while employed at ProLitho, a printing
company in Provo, Utah.
7.

In January 1993, Sole Source was changed to a joint venture between Stewart

and Junowich. Also in January 1993, Morris was hired to provide office management and customer
service.
8.

In April 1993, Sole Source, a joint venture, hired Stitt to facilitate business

expansion of the company.
9.

At the time Sole Source became a joint venture between Stewart and

Junowich, Stewart and Junowich each contributed an amount of $10,000 as capital. Sole Source was
operated as a joint venture until on or about July 1, 1993, at which time the company was
incorporated in Utah.
10.

When Sole Source was incorporated, 33% of the outstanding shares were

issued to Stewart, 33% of the outstanding shares were issued to Junowich, 17% of the outstanding
shares were issued to Morris and 17% of the outstanding shares were issued to Stitt. Morris and Stitt
each invested $5,000 in order to purchase their stock in Sole Source. The $10,000 which they used
to purchase their shares was loaned to them by Stewart. Morris and Stitt have repaid Stewart in full
for the monies borrowed to purchase stock in Sole Source.
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11.

When Sole Source was formed, the shareholders agreed to distribute the

profits of the corporation on a quarterly basis as part of the compensation to the shareholders, who
were also all employees of the corporation.
12.

Sole Source paid all of its quarterly distributions to shareholders through the

first quarter of 1994.
13.

Sole Source earned substantial second quarter revenues as the result of two

large projects produced in May and June 1994. One of the large projects was produced for R.R.
Donnelley ("Donnelley"). Sole Source was selected by Donnelley as a subcontractor to produce a
product that was one of several components of an office products line called "Communique1". This
product is owned by Avery-Dennison ("Avery") and marketed nationwide.
14.

Avery had selected Donnelley to handle the project management of

Communique1. This selection was mainly due to the sales efforts of Alane Anderson ("Anderson")
a Donnelley sales person assigned to the Avery account. Anderson serviced the Avery account for
over three years and had been successful in establishing relationships with the key management and
purchasing personnel at Avery.
15.

The Communique' project was forecast to generate in excess of $10 million

dollars in annual sales. As a Donnelley representative, Anderson was intricately involved in the
conception and development of the Communique' project within the Avery organization.
16.

Sole Source was selected by Donnelley as a subcontractor through a

connection between Anderson and Junowich. Anderson was assigned to take over select accounts
upon Junowich*s resignation from Donnelley in January 1993. Anderson contacted Sole Source to
participate as a subcontractor to Donnelley in the production of one component for Communique'.
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17.

The overall project management by Donnelley for Avery was problematic.

Donnelley contracted out most of the print manufacturing, and despite efforts by Anderson, the job
delivered significantly late to Avery. However, Sole Source was, upon information, the only
subcontractor that delivered on time and within quality standards.
18.

Due to the poor performance on behalf by Donnelley, it was Avery's decision

to solicit proposals from other vendors regarding the project management of Communique'. At this
time, Sole Source made an offer of employment to Anderson, contingent upon the award of the
project from Avery.
19.

Sole Source was awarded the project from Avery in late August 1994 and

Anderson joined Sole Source as an employee immediately thereafter to represent Sole Source in the
coordination and servicing of the Avery account.
20.

As a result of the late delivery of the product to Avery before Sole Source was

awarded the project, the sales and marketing momentum of the Communique' project diminished.
The forecast given to Sole Source by Avery was extended several times beyond the original
schedule.
21.

In late October 1994, Junowich met with the Sole Source shareholders and

announced that Anderson had received information from Avery that the project would be further
delayed and potentially downsized. Junowich also represented to the shareholders of Sole Source
that Anderson had given her notice of resignation as an employee of Sole Source, due to the
wavering commitment from Avery.
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22.

Unknown to the shareholders of Sole Source at the time, Junowich had denied

a request by Anderson to come to Salt Lake City to participate in discussions regarding the status
of the Avery account.
23.

At the same meeting of Sole Source shareholders in late October 1994,

Junowich called for a vote to lay off Anderson and another Sole Source employee, Tony Dato
("Dato"), the general manager and lead coordinator of the Avery project.
24.

At the same meeting, Junowich proposed that Sole Source resign from the

Avery Communique' project.
25.

In this meeting, Stewart voiced reservation about laying off Anderson and

Dato without additional information from Anderson regarding the status of the Avery account.
Stewart proposed that Dato continue on staff for such time until Sole Source could accurately
determine the future prospects of a continuing relationship with Avery on the Communique1 project.
Stewart expressed his concern that, especially if Anderson were to resign her employment at Sole
Source, it was essential to keep part of the Avery project team intact in order to continue the
relationship and maintain the account with Avery. At no time did Stewart vote to terminate or lay
off Anderson. To the contrary, Junowich told the Sole Source directors that Anderson had resigned
her employment. Stewart objected to the course of action proposed by Junowich, particularly
resigning the Avery account, at least until further information cold be obtained. Stewart stated that
if Sole Source did resign the Avery project, he might be interested in pursuing it individually.
26.

At this meeting, the other shareholders, Morris and Stitt, agreed with Stewart

to retain Dato as an employee of Sole Source until further information could be obtained regarding
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new developments with Anderson and Avery. However, on the following day, Morris and Stitt
changed their position and Dato was terminated on Friday, October 28, 1994.
27.

Also on Friday, October 28,1994, Anderson attempted to contact Sole Source

from California. Upon information and belief, Junowich declined to take any calls from Anderson.

28.

Stewart attempted to call Anderson over the weekend of October 29-30,1994

and finally communicated with her by telephone on Monday, October 31, 1994. At that time,
Anderson advised Stewart that Junowich had met with her in California on Sunday, October 30,
1994 and advised her that the shareholders of Sole Source had voted to terminate her employment
effective immediately.

In further discussions, Anderson denied that she had submitted her

resignation and denied that she had ever made any reference to Junowich about leaving the
employment of Sole Source. She indicated surprise that Sole Source was considering resigning from
the Avery account and surprise about the lay offs of herself and Dato. She said Junowich
represented to her that Stewart would be attempting to take over the Avery account and that Stewart
had voted to terminate Anderson.
29.

Also on Monday, October 31,1994, Stewart initiated a telephone conference

call between Morris, Stitt, Stewart and Anderson in Salt Lake City. Anderson related her recent
discussions with Avery and indicated that she had never told Junowich that she intended to resign
her employment at Sole Source.
30.

From October 31 to November 4, 1994, Stewart contacted Avery and

attempted to obtain additional information about project developments. Representatives of Avery
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indicated reluctance to deal with Sole Source given the developments, including the termination of
Anderson and Dato.
31.

Upon information and belief, Avery was disappointed to learn that Sole

Source had terminated Anderson and was concerned about the position Sole Source had taken
respecting not continuing with the Communique1 project.
32.

During the period from October 31 through November 4, 1994, Stewart

consulted with Morris and Stitt and expressed his concern about losing the Avery account and losing
employees Anderson and Dato. Stewart advised Morris and Stitt that he was interested in retaining
the Avery account, and if Sole Source could not or would not do so, he was interested in finding
another method by which the account could be salvaged.
33.

On November 4, 1994, in an informal meeting between Stewart, Stitt and

Morris, Junowich was joined to the conference by telephone. During the course of the conference,
Junowich, Morris and Stitt, voted to terminate Stewart's employment. Stewart opposed this action.
Stewart was advised that if he wanted to pursue the Avery account independently or through a new
venture, that he would be free to do so and that none of the shareholders of Sole Source, or Sole
Source itself, would view such action to be in violation of any shareholder agreement, employment
agreement or other restrictive covenant or that Sole Source would waive any such covenant.
34.

After his employment with Sole Source was purportedly terminated, Stewart

advised Morris, Stitt and Sole Source that, under these circumstances, he intended to form a new
venture and pursue the Avery business.

-1?
answer.cou\cmb

*•**

00064

35.

By a letter to its employees dated November 4, 1994, signed by Junowich,

Morris and Stitt, Sole Source announced the termination of Stewart, Dato and Anderson (aka
Abbott.) The letter circulated by Sole Source stated in pertinent part:
In an effort to support Brad Stewart in pursuing other business
opportunities, he is immediately relieved of all Sole Source Media
board of directors and management duties and responsibilities. His
management salary of $4,000 per month and related expenses are to
be terminated effective November 4, 1994. As this change is
effective immediately, this will require Brad to return all keys, credit
cards, and Sole Source property by 5:00 p.m. Friday, November 4,
1994. All personal items must be removed at that time.
The letter further stated:
Unfortunately, this "unexpected" turn of events has caused us to
evaluate the corporation "under a new light". These decisions have
come after much deliberation and we believe they are made with the
best interests of all parties in mind. We wish Brad, Tony and Alane
continued success in pursuit of their "new" venture.
Stewart did not consent to his termination by Sole Source either as an employee or as a"director.
36.

Also on November 4, 1994, Sole Source offered Stewart a separation

agreement, conveyed to him in a written offer.
37.

On November 7,1994, Sole Source granted a written waiver to Stewart of the

non-compete clause which prohibited his solicitation of existing customers of Sole Source as it
applied to the Avery-Dennison account. The waiver specifically provided that it was intended to
"allow a smooth and cooperative transition of the Avery-Dennison business to the new company,
yet unnamed" and provided "the waiver of the non-compete clause with regard to Avery-Dennison
account which would allow for Brad Stewart to actively participate in the function and operation of
the new company." The document further waived the provision that "prevents any Sole Source
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Media, Inc. shareholder from assuming ownership or a shareholder position with any other
company."
38.

Subsequently, Sole Source, through Morris and Stitt, provided an oral waiver

to Stewart and/or his new company (which later became known as Prologic), respecting Prologic's
pursuit of the business of another Sole Source account, Bonneville Communications, Inc.
("Bonneville").
39.

Consistent with its oral waiver of the Sole Source non-compete clause

contained in the agreement Stewart had executed, several weeks after Stewart had moved out of his
office at Sole Source, Sole Source delivered its customer and project files from previous Bonneville
projects to Stewart and Prologic.
40.

The waivers respecting the Avery-Dennison and Bonneville accounts were

further memorialized in a proposed settlement agreement proposed by Sole Source, Junowich,
Morris and Stitt dated March 15, 1995. That proposal specifically provided:
The company hereby agrees that Stewart may solicit or otherwise
contact the following customers or prospective customers of the
company: Bonneville Communications, Josten's Learning Corp.,
A very-Dennis (sic). Except for these customers, and as further
consideration of the settlement payment, Stewart agrees to abide by
the non-compete provisions of Section 8 of the Employment
Contract, more specifically that for the entire period of time starting
with the date of this agreement and ending October 31, 1995, he will
not contact any present or prospective customer of the company of
which he knew or had reason to know the existence of at November
4, 1994.
41.

By a letter dated December 5, 1994, Stewart was advised that the majority

shareholders of Sole Source had voted on November 4, 1994 to terminate Stewart, pursuant to
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Section 9(e) of the Employment Contract and Sole Source had resolved to exercise an option to
purchase all of Stewart's 330 shares of Sole Source stock one dollar per share or $330.00.
42.

In the course of the business of Sole Source, Sole Source sought a credit

facility from First Security Bank. Stewart personally guaranteed the credit line which First Security
Bank ultimately made available to Sole Source.
43.

On information and belief, Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt

agreed and conspired to cause Sole Source to terminate Stewart's employment. Upon information,
this action was taken so that Stewart would not be able to investigate fabrications and
misrepresentations made by Junowich to Sole Source and its officers, directors and shareholders
respecting the Avery account and the alleged resignation of Anderson.
44.

Upon information and belief, Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and

Stitt agreed and conspired to cause Sole Source to offer only $330 or $1.00 per share for the
purchase of Stewart's stock, supposedly pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement between Stewart
and Sole Source.
45.

The actions of Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt, and Sole

Source breached the Shareholders Agreement by failing to offer to Stewart the compensation
bargained for since they only offered Stewart a nominal amount for his stock, which was grossly less
than the value of the stock, particularly given that Stewart had invested more than $10,000 in cash
and significant efforts which contributed value to Sole Source. Stewart's Sole Source stock was
unconscionably undervalued at $1.00 per share given the salary expectations of Stewart, based upon
the history of compensation paid to him by the corporation, and given that he had guaranteed a line
of credit in favor of Sole Source from First Security Bank.
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46.

The Shareholders Agreement relied upon by Sole Source and Third-Party

Defendants provides in f 12(a)(ii) as follows:
In all other cases, including without limitation a proposed transfer or
the disposition not constituting a sale described in subsection (a)(i),
the Purchase Price shall be the "agreed value" determined in
accordance with subsection (b) subject to adjustment by the
independent certified public accountant then serving the Corporation
to reflect material events and changes in circumstances occurring
subsequent to the date on which the agreed value was last fixed.
Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 12 of the Shareholders Agreement provides for the adjustment of the
agreed value by the company's then certified public accountant in the event the stockholders in the
corporation fail to either reaffirm the value per share or agree upon a new value at the end of any
fiscal year.
48.

In violation of the Agreement, Sole Source and Junowich, Morris and Stitt

ignored this provision of the Shareholders Agreement and made no effort to adjust the amount
offered for Stewart's shares to reflect material events and factors which increased the value of
Stewart's shares.
49.

Stewart's compensation from Sole Source was governed by his Employment

Agreement which provided for an annual salary of $60,000.00 (Employment Agreement, 13(a)) and
additional compensation consisting of quarterly distributions of net profits of Sole Source in
accordance with the Shareholders Agreement. (Employment Contract, f 3(b)).
50.

Paragraph 3 of the Shareholders Agreement provided for the percentage

distribution of profits of the corporation to shareholders. Pursuant to that agreement, Stewart was
entitled to receive a distribution of 31% of the profits of the corporation. (Shareholders Agreement,
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51.

Pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement, directors of the corporation could

not be removed and new directors could not be elected without the unanimous vote of the
shareholders of the corporation.

(Shareholders Agreement, f4). There was never a unanimous

vote of the shareholders of Sole Source to remove Stewart as a director of the corporation.
52.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Shareholders Agreement, Stewart was vice

president of the corporation. Under the Shareholders Agreement, Stewart could not be removed by
the board of directors and new officers could not be elected or appointed absent the unanimous vote
of the board of directors and the shareholders of the corporation. No such unanimous vote of the
directors of the corporation or its shareholders provided for either the removal of Stewart or his
replacement as vice president of the corporation.
53.

The actions of the Third-Party Defendants including Junowich, Morris and

Stitt, to terminate Stewart's employment as an officer of the corporation and to remove him as a
director of the corporation were expressly prohibited by the terms of the Shareholders Agreement
between Stewart, Sole Source and Third-Party Defendants.
54.

Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt signed the Shareholder

Agreement signed by Stewart. Thus they knew that directors of the corporation and officers of the
corporation could not be removed or replaced without the unanimous vote of all directors and all
shareholders of the corporation, including Stewart. They were also aware of Stewart's Employment
Contract with Sole Source.
55.

Following November 4, 1994, Sole Source, Junowich, Morris and Stitt

undertook actions to prevent Stewart from acting as an officer, director and shareholder of the
corporation including but not limited to the following:
-1 7
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a.

They failed to provide Stewart with notice of meetings of
shareholders, directors or officers of the corporation;

b.

They required Stewart to surrender his keys to the Sole Source offices
and declined to let him continue in his employment at those premises;

c.

They withheld from Stewart financial information relating to the
corporation, including information which demonstrated that the
corporation withheld from Stewart quarterly bonuses which were in
fact paid to other employees, officers and shareholders of the
corporation. Upon information, such bonuses were withheld from
Stewart even for periods when Stewart was, at all times, employed at
Sole Source;

d.

Further, while indicating that the corporation lacked funds to pay
Stewart the monies owed to him for his quarterly bonus, Junowich,
Morris and Stitt caused the corporation to increase their own salaries.
Since the time that action was taken, the corporation has, upon
information and belief, paid Junowich, Morris and Stitt at elevated
compensation levels.

56.

The meeting on November 4, 1994 was an informal meeting and no notice

of the meeting or of any agenda or the meeting was provided to Stewart in advance thereof. In spite
of this, Junowich, Morris and Stitt apparently knew the agenda as the memo to Sole Source
employees and a separation agreement were presented to Stewart on the same day the meting
occurred.
18
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57.

No written notice of shareholder approval of the termination of Stewart was

given to Stewart as a shareholder of Sole Source. Stewart did not consent in writing to a
shareholders meeting. Nevertheless, the reported action taken by the corporation upon a vote of the
majority of the shareholders on November 4, 1994 was implemented immediately.
58.

Defendants Sole Source, Junowich, Morris and Stitt have shut Stewart out

from the operations of Sole Source. Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt have wrongfully seized
control of the company and have ignored and are ignoring corporate formalities for their own
wrongful, illegal and fraudulent purposes, including but not limited to the conspiratorial actions to
deprive Stewart of his equity interest in the company and his employment. Because of the growth
of the company and the peculiar nature of the agreements between the parties, Counter-Claim
Defendant and Third-Party Defendants determined to breach their fiduciary duties to Stewart and
they attempted to use the agreements signed between the parties to deprive Stewart of his
employment as well as the fruits and benefits of his labor and related investment.
5 9.

Because Defendant Junowich, Morris and Stitt have wrongfully seized control

of Sole Source and have oppressed Stewart and his rights as a minority shareholder, the corporation
should be dissolved pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Business Corporation Act, §16-1 Oa-1 et
seq, U.C.A. 1953 as amended.
60.

Alternatively, Stewart should be awarded the damages he has incurred as a

result of the wrongful usurpation by Junowich, Morris and Stitt.
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(DECLARATORY RELIEF)
61.

Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and

Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length.
62.

A legitimate controversy exists between Stewart and Sole Source, Junowich,

Morris and Stitt respecting Stewart's status as an employee of Sole Source, as a shareholder of Sole
Source, and as an officer and director of Sole Source.
63.

Pursuant ot the provisions of §78-33-1 et seg, U.C.A. 1953 as amended,

Stewart is entitled to a declaratory judgment interpreting his statutory rights as a shareholder of Sole
Source and his contractual rights as an officer, director, shareholder and employee of Sole Source.
Stewart is further entitled to a declaratory judgment determining that Sole Source and/or Junowich,
Morris and Stitt have taken actions unauthorized by the shareholders or directors of Sole Source and
Stewart is entitled to a declaration that Stewart's employment was wrongfully terminated. Stewart
is further entitled to a declaration of the Court determining that he is entitled to be compensated for
the reasonable value of his interest in Sole Source pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement and in
equity, such that Stewart is entitled to be paid more than $1.00 per share for his 330 shares of Sole
Source stock.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(DISSOLUTION FOR OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS)
64.

Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and

Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length.
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65.

Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt and each of them are directors or are

otherwise in control of Sole Source.
66.

The actions of Junowich, Morris and Stitt in purporting to terminate Stewart's

employment, in purporting to require Stewart to sell his shares in the corporation without fair
consideration and in purporting to remove Stewart as an officer and director of Sole Source are
illegal, oppressive and fraudulent.
67.

Pursuant to the provisions of §16-10a-1430, Stewart prays that this Court

judicially dissolve Sole Source and that incident thereto, this Court appoint a receiver for Sole
Source pursuant to the provisions of §16-10a-1432 or otherwise pursuant to this Court's equitable
powers.
68.

Stewart is entitled to damages from Sole Source, Junowich, Morris and Stitt

and each of them by virtue of their oppression of his minority shareholder rights in an amount to be
proven at trial.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
AND ECONOMIC EXPECTANCIES)
69.

Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and

Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length.
70.

In purporting to have Sole Source terminate Stewart's employment and to

require Stewart to surrender his shares of stock, Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt
have interfered with known contractual relationships between Stewart and Sole Source and/or have
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interfered with economic expectancies of Stewart related to his continued employment and his
investment potential with Sole Source.
71.

Specifically, Junowich, induced the other shareholders and directors of Sole

Source to undertake these actions based upon misrepresentations that Anderson had resigned her
position with Sole Source.
72.

The interference of Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt also

occurred when they purported to have the corporation terminate Stewart and to require Stewart to
surrender his shares of stock in Sole Source.
73.

The interference by Junowich, Morris and Stitt alleged above was wrongful

against Stewart and committed by improper means or for an improper purpose.
74.

Stewart has been damaged by the conduct of Third-Party Defendants in an

amount to be proven at trial.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING)
75.

Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and

Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length.
76.

Inherent in all contracts under Utah law is an implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing.
77.

The Shareholders Agreement and the Employment Agreement executed by

Stewart contain such implied covenants.
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78.

Sole Source and/or Third-party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt

breached their covenants of good faith and fair dealing in purporting to cause Stewart's termination
from employment with Sole Source and in purporting to require Stewart to sell his stock to Sole
Source for an unreasonably inadequate sum.
79.

Stewart has been damaged by virtue of the breach of the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing by Sole Source and/or Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY)
80.

Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and

Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length.
81.

As directors and controlling shareholders of Sole Source, Third-Party

Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt owed Stewart, as a minority shareholder, a fiduciary duty.
82.

Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt breached their fiduciary duty owed

to Stewart by, among other things, not observing appropriate corporate formalities in purporting to
direct Sole Source to terminate Stewart's employment; by requiring Stewart to sell his shares in Sole
Source for an inadequate price; by violating Stewart's minority shareholder rights; and by having
Sole Source terminate Stewart's employment when to do so was not in the interest of the
corporation.
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SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(ACCOUNTING AND JUDGMENT)
83.

Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and

Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length.
84.

Pursuant to his Employment Agreement and Shareholders Agreement with

the corporation and/or Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and Stitt, Stewart was entitled to
be paid his draw plus quarterly distributions of corporate profits of Sole Source.
85.

Sole Source and Third-Party Defendants and each of them, have failed and

refused to account to Stewart for the amount of the profits and have failed and refused to pay to
Stewart the profits even for the period during which Stewart was actively employed by the
corporation and actually worked for Sole Source.
86.

Stewart is entitled to an accounting from Sole Source and Third-Party

Defendants and each of them respecting the revenues and expenses of Sole Source, the calculation
of its profits, payments made to other shareholders and directors of Sole Source including the
amounts of salary increases given to Junowich, Morris and Stitt after Stewart was terminated and
the amount of compensation owed to Stewart.
87.

Stewart is further entitled to a judgment against Sole Source for any amounts

due and owing to him as the result of such accounting.
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SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(PUNITIVE DAMAGES)
88.

Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and

Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length.
89.

The actions of Sole Source and Third-Party Defendants Junowich, Morris and

Stitt were intentional, wilful and malicious as regards Stewart and Stewart is entitled to an award of
punitive damages to deter Sole Source, Junowich, Morris and Stitt from future similar conduct.

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(BREACH OF CONTRACT)
90.

Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and

Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length.
91.

Sole Source, by refusing to pay Stewart the compensation to which he was

entitled pursuant to the Employment Contract and the Shareholders Agreement, including but not
limited to compensation which Stewart earned during the time which he was employed by Sole
Source, has breached its agreements with Stewart and is liable to Stewart for all damages incurred
by virtue of its failure to pay wages, salaries and bonuses to Stewart as provided in those agreements
and according to the practices of Sole Source.
92.

Stewart is entitled to an accounting from Sole Source to determine the

amounts owed to him and to a judgment for any amounts found to be due and owing.
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93.

Sole Source, Junowich, Morris and Stitt also breached the Shareholders

Agreement by firing Stewart and forcing Stewart to sell or redeem his shares for grossly inadequate
consideration.

NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(INDEMNIFICATION)
94.

Stewart herein incorporates all previous allegations of this Counterclaim and

Third-Party Complaint as if set forth here at length.
95.

Incident to his employment by Sole Source and his status as a shareholder,

officer and director of that corporation, Stewart guaranteed a credit facility extended by First
Security Bank of Utah to Sole Source.
96.

Upon information and belief, the line of credit to Sole Source from First

Security Bank of Utah, guaranteed by Stewart, is still outstanding and a balance is owed.
97.

Stewart is entitled to an order requiring Sole Source to indemnify him against

any liability on his guarantee of payment of the line of credit facility.
98.

In the alternative, Sole Source should be required to obtain a release of any

liability of Stewart to First Security Bank of Utah relating to the line of credit facility extended to
Sole Source.
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WHEREFORE, Stewart prays judgment against Sole Source, Junowich, Morris and
Stitt as follows:
1.

For declaratory relief as more particularly alleged herein.

2.

For an accounting from Sole Source and Third-Party Defendants respecting

compensation owed tro Stewart and respecting the value of Sole Source for the purpose of
determining a value to be paid for Stewart's shares in the corporation.
3.

For such actual damages as are proven at trial based upon the accounting

requested herein and other claims.
4.

For punitive damages as proven at trial.

5.

For reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded pursuant to the agreements

between the parties.
6.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper in the premises.

DATED this [ V day of April 1996.

COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

JEFFREY L. SILVESTRINI
Attorneys for Brad Stewart and Pro Logic, a Utah
Partnership
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a member of and/or employed in the law firm of
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C., 525 East First South, Suite 500, P.O. Box 11008, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84147-0008, and that in said capacity, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be mailed to the person(s) named below:
Russell C. Fericks, Esq.
Gary Johnson, Esq.
Matthew C. Barneck, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2465
on the lb

day of
o April 1996.

X

<*.
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ADDENDUM "B"
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
Dated December 1,1993

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT

THIS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT (the "Contract") is made and entered
into this first day of December, 1993, by and between Brad Stewart
(hereinafter "Employee") and Sole Source Media, Inc., a Utah
corporation, (hereinafter "Employer")•
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS,

Employer

is engaged

in the business

of print

management.
WHEREAS, Employee has been engaged and has had a great deal of
experience in the above-designated business; and
WHEREAS, the Employee is willing to be employed by Employer,
and Employer is willing to employ the Employee on the terms,
covenants and conditions hereinafter set forth;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises
hereinafter contained, it is agreed as follows:
1.

EMPLOYMENT,

Employer hereby employs, engages and hires Employee to render
such services and duties in connection with Employees business as
may be assigned to the Employee by Employer from time to time, and
the Employee hereby accepts and agrees to such hiring, engagement
and employment.
2-

TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT,

The term of this agreement shall be for the period commencing
on or about December 1, 1993, and terminating on or about June 30,
1996,

subject, however, to prior

termination

as hereinafter

1
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provided.

Continued employment of the Employee by Employer after

Deceiaber 1, 1996, shall be for the term and on the conditions
agreed to by the parties prior to the expiration of this agreement.
3.

COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEE.

a.

Annual

Compensation.

Subject

to

increases

under

paragraph c, Employer shall pay the Employee an annual salary of
$60,000.00.

Such

annual

salary

shall

be

paid

as follows:

$2,500.00 on the first (1st) of each month and $2,500.00 on the
fifteenth (15th) of each month.
b.

Additional Compensation. As additional compensation, and

in consideration of Employee's promise set forth in section 7,
herein,
Quarterly

Employer

agrees

to

compensate

distributions of net profits

Employee

as

follows;

in accordance to the

Shareholder's Agreement of Sole Source Media, Inc., executed on or
about December 1, 1993.
c.

Increases in Compensation.

The annual salary of the

Employee shall be increased, and the Employee shall be entitled to
such bonuses, as may be determined from time to time in the sole
discretion of the Employer.
d.

Reduction for Taxes.

Employer shall have the right to

deduct from the compensation payable to the Employee under the
provisions of this agreement, social security taxes, and all
federal, state and municipal taxes and charges as may now be in
effect or which may hereafter be enacted or required as charges on
the compensation of the Employee.

2

4.

BEST EFFORTS OF EMPLOYEE,

The Employee agrees that he will at all times faithfully,
industriously and -to the best of his ability, experience and
talents, perform all of the duties that may be required of and from
him pursuant to the express and implicit terms hereof, to the
reasonable satisfaction of the Employer,

Such duties shall be

rendered at and all places as Employer shall in good faith require
or as the interest, needs, business of opportunity of Employer
shall require.
5-

OTHER EMPLOYMENT.

Employee shall devote all of his time, attention, knowledge,
and skills solely to the business and interest of Employer, and
Employer shall be entitled to all of the benefits, profits or other
issues arising from or incident to all work, services and advice of
Employee, and Employee shall not, during the term hereof, be
interested directly or indirectly, in any manner, partner, officer,
stockholder, advisor, employee or in any other capacity in any
other business of the type an character of business engaged in by
Employer, or any allied trade; provided, however, that nothing
herein contained shall be deemed to prevent or limit the right of
Employee to invest any of his surplus funds in the capital stock or
other securities of any corporation whose stock or securities are
publicly owned or are regularly traded on any public exchange, nor
shall anything herein contained by deemed to prevent Employee from
investing or limit the Employee's right to invest his surplus funds
in real estate.
3
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6.

TRADE SECRETS,

Except as required by law or in his duties to Employer,
Employee will not, either during the period of his employment by
Employer or at any time thereafter, except as authorized or
directed in writing by Employer, directly or indirectly, use,
disseminate, disclose, copy, make notes of, lecture upon or publish
articles concerning, any confidential information of Employer for
any

reason

or purpose whatsoever.

Upon termination

of his

employment with Employer for any reason, all records, documents,
notes, data, memoranda, models, equipment or similar matter which
constitute, contain or relate to any confidential information then
in the Employee's possession, custody or control, whether prepared
in whole or in part by him or others, will be left with Employer.
For purposes of this provision, the term "confidential information"
means trade secrets or any other information disclosed to Employee
or known to Employee as a consequence of or through his employment
by Employer which is not public knowledge, including, but not
limited

to,

inventions,

information
manufacture,

relating

to

purchasing,

research,

development,

accounting,

engineering,

marketing, merchandising and selling. The parties hereby stipulate
and agree that violation or breach of the terms of this paragraph
shall be a material breach of this agreement.
7.

COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE AFTER TERMINATION.

In

furtherance

confidential

of

information

protecting
as set

Employer's

forth

interest

in section

in

6, and in

consideration of the additional compensation to be paid as provided
4
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in section 3, paragraph b, the parties hereby stipulate and agree
that for a period

of six

(6) months

from the date of the

termination of the Employee's employment with Employer, whether
voluntary or involuntary and for whatever reason, Employee will
not, unless first obtaining Employer's waiver of these provisions:
a-

Ownership or Management. Directly or indirectly, in

any manner, as partner, office, stockholder, advisor or in any
other

capacity,

own, manage,

operation

or

control, or

participate in the ownership, management or control, of any
business of the type and character of business engaged in by
Employer at the time of termination of Employee,s employment,
or any allied trade; or
b.

Employment. Be employed in any business of the type

and character of business engaged in by Employer at the time
of termination of Employee's employment, or any allied trade,
in any capacity in which Employee could utilize confidential
information, as defined for purposes, of paragraph 6, to the
detriment of Employer's business.
The provisions of this paragraph shall apply only to prohibited
activities of Employee conducted relative to those geographical
areas in the states to be determined by the Board of Directors
wherein Employer is marketing, selling, distributing or furnishing
products or services at the time of termination of Employee's
employment with Employer, and the additional geographic area in
those states wherein Employer could reasonably be expected, at the
time of termination of Employee's employment with Employer, to
5
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market, sell, distribute

or furnish products or services of

expansion of its business activities, such additional geographic
area to be identified to the Employee by Employer in writing within
90 days following the Employee's termination of employment with
Employer.

The provision of this paragraph shall not be deemed to

prevent or limit the right of Employee to invest any of his surplus
funds in the capital stock or other securities of any corporation
whose stock or securities are publicly owned or are regularly
traded on any public exchange, nor shall anything herein contained
be deemed to prevent Employee from investing or limit Employee's
right to invest his surplus funds in real estate.

Any of the

foregoing to the contrary notwithstanding, the provisions of this
section 7 shall not apply if the termination of the Employee's
employment with the Company comes within the meaning of section 10,
paragraph a, herein*
8.

RESTRICTIONS ON USE OR DISCLOSURE OF CUSTOMER LIST AND
OTHER INFORMATION.

For a period of one (1) year following his termination of
employment for whatever reason, Employee agrees to neither call on
nor solicit, either for himself or any other person or firm, for
any

purpose

relating

in

any

way

to

Employer's

business

or

prospective business, any of whom Employee first learned during his
employment hereunder, nor shall Employee make known to any person
or firm, either directly or indirectly, the names and addresses of
any such customers.

In addition, for a period of one (1) year

following his termination of employment

for whatever reason,

Employee agrees not to make known to any person or firm, either
6
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directly or indirectly, any information relating in any manner to
Employer's trade or business relationship with any of the customers
of Employer on whom Employee called, with whom Employee became
acquainted, or of whom Employee learned during his employment
hereunder•
9.

TERMINATION.
a.

Due to Discontinuance of Business. Anything herein

contained to the contrary notwithstanding, in the event that
Employer, or his successors or assigns, shall discontinue
operation his business as it relates to Donald Junowich, then
this agreement shall terminate as of the last day of the month
in which Employer, or his successors or assigns, ceases such
operations with the same force and effect as if such last day
of the month were originally set as the termination date
hereof.
b.

Prolonged Illness of Employee. If the disability or

incapacity of Employee to properly perform his duties should
continue during any employment period for a consecutive of six
(6) months, Employer, at his option, may terminate this
agreement, whereupon Employer shall be released from all
further obligations contained in this agreement.
c.

Death of Employee.

This agreement shall terminate

immediately on the death of Employee, and on the happening of
that event, Employer shall not be liable for payment of salary
accruing thereafter.

7
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d.

By Employer.

This agreement may be terminated by

Employer on thirty (30) days written notice to Employee.
e.

Breach by Employee.

Except as otherwise provided

elsewhere in this section 10, the parties hereby agree and
stipulate that if during the term of this agreement, Employee
should fail or refuse to perform the services as provided in
sections 1 and 4, or should be unable to so perform, or should
terminate his employment with Employer, or should engage in
gainful employment with another employer without the express
written consent of Employer, or should otherwise breach any of
the

terms

of this

agreement,

Employer

may

regard

this

agreement as materially breached by Employee, Employer's
obligation to make the payments herein shall cease, and
Employer may obtain relief in the amount of damages suffered
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
f.

Equitable Relief.

In addition to any other remedy

provided for herein or at law, it is further agree that any
breach or evasion of any of the terms of this agreement by
either party will result in immediate and irreparable injury
to the other party and will authorize recourse to injunction
and/or specific performance.
10.

REPRESENTATIONS BY EMPLOYEE.

Employee represents and warrants that he is not a party to,
nor bound by, any agreement with any person, firm or corporation,
whether written or oral, which in any way limits his employment
with Employer or the duties he may perform for Employer, or which
8
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limits him in any way from imparting to Employer any knowledge or
understanding he may have which might be of use in Employer's
business; provided, however, that nothing in this agreement shall
require Employee to disclose to Employer any trade secret or other
confidential information belonging to others of which Employee has
knowledge unless the owner of such trade secret or confidential
information shall authorize disclosure thereof, and withholding of
such trade secret or confidential information shall not be a breach
of this agreement.
11.

MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT.

No waiver

or modification

of this agreement or of any

covenant, condition or limitation herein contained shall be valid
unless in writing and fully executed by the party to be charged
therewith, and no evidence of any waiver or modification shall be
offered or received in evidence of any proceeding, arbitration or
litigation between the parties hereto arising out of or affecting
this agreement or the rights or obligations

of the parties

hereunder, unless such waiver or modification is in writing, duly
executed as aforesaid, and the parties further agree that the
provisions of this paragraph may not be waived except as herein set
forth.
12.

SEVERABILITY.

All agreements and covenants contained herein are severable,
and in the event any of them, with the exception of those contained
in paragraphs one and three, shall be held to be invalid by any
court

of

competent

jurisdiction,

this

agreement

shall

be

9
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interpreted as if such invalid agreements or covenants were not
contained herein.
13.

NOTICES.

Any notice required or permitted to be given under this
agreement shall be sufficient if in writing and sent by mail to the
residence of either party.
14.

CHOICE OF LAW.

It is the intention of the parties hereto that this agreement
and the performance hereunder and all suits and special proceedings
hereunder be construed in accordance with and under and pursuant to
the laws of the State of Utah and that in any action, special
proceeding or other proceeding that may be brought, arising out of,
in connection with, or by reason of this agreement, the laws of the
State of Utah shall be applicable and shall govern to the exclusion
of the law of any other forum, without regard to the jurisdiction
in which any action or special proceeding may be instituted.
15.

ARBITRATION.

Any differences, claims, or matters in dispute arising between
Employer and Employee out of or connected with this Contract shall
be submitted by them to arbitration by the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA") or its successor and the determination of the
AAA shall be final and absolute. The arbitrator shall be governed
by the duly promulgated rules and regulations of the AAA or its
successor, and pertinent provisions of the law of the State of
Utah, relating to arbitration. The decision of the arbitrator may

10
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be entered as a judgment in any court of the State of Utah or
elsewhere,
16-

ATTORNEYS7 FEES,

In the event that any action is filed in relation to this
Contract, the unsuccessful party in the action shall pay to the
successful party, in addition to all the sums that either party may
be called on to pay, a reasonable sum for the successful party7s
attorneys7 fees.
17.

PARAGRAPH HEADINGS.

The titles to the paragraphs of this Contract are solely for
the convenience of the Parties and shall not be used to explain,
modify, simplify, or aid in the interpretation of the provisions of
this Contract.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Employer and Employee have signed this
agreement this first day of December, 1993.

SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC.,
a Utah corporation (the "Employer")

By

1 / ^ y ,

i

rv».-*y><ai<,
P>».^/><.

Its

Stewart (€he "Emplojfee"]"
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ADDENDUM "C"
SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT
Dated July 1,1993

SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT
OP
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC.

THIS SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is made as of
the first day of July, 1993, by and among Sole Source Media, Inc.,
a Utah corporation (the "Corporation"), Donald Junowich, Brad
Stewart, Kevin Stitt and William Morris
(collectively the
"Shareholders"); collectively referred to as the "Parties", or
individually, a "Party".
WHEREAS, the Corporation has an authorized capital stock
consisting of 10,000 shares of common stock, no par value (the
"Shares");
WHEREAS, the Shareholders are the legal and beneficial owners
of all of the issued and outstanding Shares of stock, consisting of
1,000 Shares;
WHEREAS, the Parties believe that it is in the best interests
of the Corporation and the Shareholders to establish certain
agreements concerning governance of the Corporation, to make
provision for the future disposition of the Shares and other
matters relating to the Shares.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises
hereinafter contained, the sufficiency of which is hereby
acknowledged, it is agreed as follows:
1.

Definitiongr

For purposes of this Agreement:

(a) The "Board of Directors" shall mean all Directors of
the Corporation then constituting the Board of Directors of the
Corporation.
(b) The term "Corporation Act" shall mean the Utah
Revised Business Corporation Act.
(c) The term "Director" means any person acting now or
in the future as a director of the Corporation.

1
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(d) The term "Future Shareholder" includes any person or
entity obtaining ownership of any shares,
(e) The term "Shares" means shares of the common stock
of the Corporation presently outstanding and all shares of common
stock of the Corporation which may hereafter be issued by the
Corporation.
(f) The term "Shareholders" includes
entities named in the caption of this Agreement.

the

person

or

2.
Term. The "Term" of this Agreement shall be for three
years (3) years, unless earlier terminated or extended by the
unanimous written consent of the Corporation, the Shareholders and
any Future Shareholder who becomes bound by the terms of this
Agreement as provided below. Notwithstanding, the provision set
forth herein shall remain in full force and effect for so long as
any Shares remain issued and outstanding and owned by more than one
Shareholder or the direct or subsequent transferee of a
Shareholder.
3.
Distributions to Shareholders. During the Term of this
Agreement, the Shareholders agree that distributions of profits of
the Corporation shall be in the following percentages, regardless
of whether such percentages are in proportion to the actual
percentage of ownership of Shares:

1

Shareholder

Distribution

|

1 Donald Junowich

31 Percent

|

H Brad Stewart

31 Percent

|

Kevin Stitt

15 Percent

1 William Morris

15 Percent

The remaining eight percent (8%) shall be set aside to
appropriated by the Board of Directors for corporate purposes as
deemed necessary, but in no event shall such profits be carried
the books of the Corporation for a period in excess of 75 days
required and governed by applicable I.R.S. regulations.

be
is
on
as

4.
Directors.
During the Term of this Agreement, the
following individuals shall serve as Directors of the Corporation,
and shall not be removed and new Directors shall not be elected,
without the unanimous vote of the Shareholders of the Corporation:

2

00

Directors

|

J Donald Junowich
1 Brad Stewart
1 Kevin Stitt
1 William Morris
5.
Officers.
During the Term of this Agreement, the
following individuals shall serve in the offices stated next to
their name, and shall not be removed by the Board of Directors and
new officers shall not be elected or appointed unless with the
unanimous vote of the Board of Directors and the Shareholders:

1

Name

Title

I Donald Junowich

President

fl

1 Brad Stewart

Vice President

||

] Kevin Stitt

Secretary

|

| William Morris

Treasurer

6.
Dissolution of the Corporation, The Corporation shall
automatically dissolve on June 30, 1996, unless extended by a
majority vote of holders of the issued stock at a duly called
meeting of the Corporation.
7.
Scope of Agreement.
This Agreement shall only be
enforceable against and with respect to the Corporation, the
Shareholders and Future Shareholders who specifically agree to be
bound by the terms of this Agreement in writing at the time of such
Future Shareholders' acquisition of Shares.
8.

Compliance with the Securities Act.

(a) Each Shareholder agrees that he or she will not
sell, transfer, distribute or otherwise dispose of any of the
Shares except (i) pursuant to an effective registration statement
under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Act") as then in effect
covering such Shares and such proposed disposition or (ii) upon
first furnishing to the Corporation an opinion of counsel
satisfactory to the Corporation stating that the proposed sale,
transfer, distribution or other disposition is not in violation of
the registration requirements of the Act and providing such
undertakings and agreements with the Corporation by the proposed
transferee as the Corporation may reasonably require to insure
continued compliance with the Act.

3

002

(b) Each Shareholder acknowledges that his or her Shares
are restricted securities that are unregistered, and that he or she
must hold them indefinitely unless they are subsequently registered
under the Act or an exemption from such registration is available;
and that the Corporation is under no obligation to register the
Shares or to comply with any such exemption.
9.

Restriction on Lifetime Transfer of Shares.

(a) Before any of the Shares may be sold or transferred,
including transfer by operation of law and by pledgees or holders
of other security interests desiring to exercise a power of sale,
the holder of such Shares proposing such sale or transfer (the
"Transferor") shall first give written notice thereof to the
Corporation and each other Shareholder, stating the proposed
transferee, the number of Shares proposed to be transferred, the
purchase price, if any, and the terms of the proposed transaction.
The Corporation shall thereupon have the option, but not the
obligation, to acquire some or all of the Shares proposed to be
transferred for the purchase price provided in Section 18 (the
"Purchase Price"). Within thirty (30) days after the giving of
such notice by the Transferor, the Corporation shall give written
notice to the Transferor and to the other Shareholders stating
whether or not it elects to exercise the option to purchase, the
number of Shares, if any, it elects to purchase and a date and time
(the "Closing Date") for consummation of the purchase which Closing
Date shall not be less than sixty (60) or more than ninety (90)
days after the giving of such notice. Failure by the Corporation
to give such notice within such time period shall be deemed an
election by the Corporation not to exercise such option.
The
Transferor shall not be entitled to vote, either as a stockholder
or director, in connection with the decision of the Corporation
whether to exercise its option to purchase his or her Shares;
provided, that if his or her vote is required for valid corporate
action, the Transferor shall vote in accordance with the decision
of the majority of the other directors or Shareholders.
(b) If the Corporation fails to exercise such option
with respect to all of the Shares proposed to be transferred, each
Shareholder (other than the Transferor) shall thereupon have the
option, but not the obligation, to purchase for the Purchase Price
that portion of all of the Shares proposed to be transferred as to
which the Corporation has not exercised its option in proportion to
the Shareholders then ownership of Shares. Within forty-five (45)
days after the giving of the notice provided in subsection (a)
hereof by the Transferor, each other Shareholder shall give written
notice to the Transferor, the other Shareholders and the
Corporation stating whether or not he or she elects to exercise his
or her option, the umber of Shares, if any, which he or she elects
to purchase, and a date and time (the "Closing Date") for
consummation of the purchase not less than thirty (30) or more than
sixty (60) days after the giving of such notice. Such Closing Date
4
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shall be the same date as the Closing Date selected by the
Corporation if it has exercised its option provided in subsection
(a) . If any Shareholder elects not to exercise his or her option
with respect to some or all of the Shares which he or she is
entitled to purchase, each of the other Shareholders may elect to
purchase such Shares in the manner provided in this subsection.
Failure by any Shareholder to give such notice with such time
period shall be deemed an election by the Shareholder not to
exercise his or her option.
(c) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the
Transferor shall in no event be required to sell hereunder less
than all of the Shares proposed to be transferred in accordance
with his or her notice under subsection (a).
(d) If all of the Shares offered hereunder are not
purchased within the respective time periods stated above, the
Transferor may transfer such Shares at any time during the 30-day
period after the termination of the applicable time period, but
only upon the terms and to the transferee stated in his or her
notice under subsection (a) . After such Shares are so transferred,
or if the transfer is not consummated within such period, the
Shares shall again become subject to the terms of this Agreement.
10.

Corporation's Option to Purchase Shares.

(a) In the event of the termination of employment of a
Shareholder with the Corporation for any reason other than death
(provided, that in connection with the termination, there is no
bona fide offer to purchase under Section 9), the Corporation shall
have the option to purchase all of the Shares owned by such
Shareholder at his or her termination of employment, at the
Purchase Price. If the option is exercised by the Corporation, the
purchase by the Corporation shall be consummated within ninety (90)
days after the Shareholder's termination of employment.
(b) The Corporation shall pay fifteen percent (15%) of
the Purchase Price at the time of closing the sale and the balance
in ten (10) equal annual installments of principal commencing on
the first anniversary of the closing with interest on the unpaid
principal balance at ten percent (10%) per annum. Prepayment in
whole or in part without penalty may be made at any time. In the
event that the Corporation is in default in the payment of any
installment of principal or interest, the principal balance and all
accrued interest shall become immediately due and payable at the
option of the payee. In the event that legally available funds are
insufficient to pay any installment, the Corporation shall take
such
reasonable
action,
including
without
limitation
a
recapitalization or revaluation of assets, as may be legally
permissible to create sufficient available funds for such payment.

5
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(c) The certificates for the Shares purchased by the
Corporation shall be held by the Shareholder as security for the
payment of the Purchase Price, and such certificates shall be
delivered to the Corporation, duly endorsed, concurrently with the
payment of the last installment of Purchase Price.
Shares
purchased by the Corporation shall not be considered outstanding or
entitled to vote so long as the Corporation is not in default
hereunder•
(d) Until the entire Purchase Price for all Shares
purchased by the Corporation has been paid in full, the Corporation
shall not:
(1) pay any dividend or make any distribution with
respect to Shares outside the ordinary course of business; (2)
purchase, redeem or otherwise reacquire any Shares other than
pursuant to this Agreement; or (3) take any other action outside
the ordinary course of business which may reasonably be expected to
increase the risk of nonpayment of the unpaid balance of the
Purchase Price.
11.

Corporation's Obligation to Purchase Shares.

(a) In the event of the death of a Shareholder, the
Corporation shall purchase and the estate of the deceased
Shareholder shall sell all Shares owned by such Shareholder at his
or her death, at the Purchase Price.
The purchase by the
Corporation shall be consummated within thirty (30) days after the
appointment of the Shareholder's legal representative.
The
Corporation's obligation to purchase Shares hereunder shall remain
in effect notwithstanding any transfer of the Shares by a
Shareholder or any subsequent stockholder. To fund the obligation
of the Corporation to purchase Shares owned by a deceased
Shareholder, the Corporation intends to purchase and maintain in
effect one or more insurance policies on the life of each
Shareholder which name the Corporation as beneficiary.
(b) With respect to Shares purchased by the Corporation
under this Section, the Corporation shall pay any proceeds of life
insurance policies on the life of the deceased Shareholder received
by the Corporation to the estate (or trust established by the
Shareholder and designated by the Shareholder in a written notice
delivered to the Corporation during his or her lifetime identifying
the trust as the entity to receive such payments) of the deceased
Shareholder to the extent of the Purchase Price.
The excess
insurance proceeds, if any, shall be the property of the
Corporation.
After payment of the insurance proceeds, the
Corporation may elect to pay the unpaid balance, if any, of the
Purchase Price in installments in accordance with the following
term:
(i)
The Corporation shall pay fifteen percent
(15%) of the unpaid balance of Purchase Price at the time of
closing the sale and the balance in five (5) equal annual
6
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installments of principal commencing on the first anniversary of
the closing with interest on the unpaid principal balance at ten
percent (10%) per annum. Prepayment in whole or in part without
penalty may be made at any time. In the event that the Corporation
is in default int he payment of any installment of principal or
interest, the principal balance and all accrued interests shall
become immediately due and payable at the option of the payee. In
the event that legally available funds are insufficient to pay any
installment, the corporation shall take such reasonable action,
including without limitation a recapitalization or revaluation of
assets, as may be legally permissible to create sufficient
available funds for such payment.
(ii) The certificates for the Shares purchased by
the Corporation shall be held by the estate of the deceased
Shareholder as security for the payment of the Purchase Price, and
such certificates shall be delivered to the Corporation, duly
endorsed, concurrently with the payment of the last installment of
Purchase Price. Shares purchased by the Corporation shall not be
considered outstanding or entitled to vote so long as the
Corporation is not in default hereunder.
(iii) Until the entire Purchase Price for all Shares
purchased by the Corporation has been paid in full, the Corporation
shall not: (1) pay any dividend or make any distribution with
respect to Shares outside the ordinary course of business; (2)
purchase, redeem or otherwise reacquire any Shares other than
pursuant to this Agreement; or (3) take any other action outside
the ordinary course of business which may reasonably be expected to
increase the risk of nonpayment of the unpaid balance of the
Purchase Price.
12.

The Purchase Price.
(a)

The Purchase Price shall be determined as follows:

(i)
In the case of a proposed sale or transfer
under Section 15 to a third party in a bona fide transaction for
fair value, payable in cash or the equivalent currently or in
future installments, the Purchase Price for such Shares shall be
the value offered by such third party payable upon the same terms.
(ii) In all other cases, including without
limitation a proposed transfer or the disposition not constituting
a sale described in subsection (a)(i), the Purchase Price shall be
the "agreed value" determined in accordance with subsection (b)
subject to adjustment by the independent certified public
accountant then serving the Corporation to reflect material events
and changes in circumstances occurring subsequent to the date on
which the agreed value was last fixed.
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(b) Until changed as provided hereafter, the "agreed
value" per Share as of the date of this Agreement is one Dollar
($1). This price has been agreed upon by the Corporation and the
Shareholders as representing the fair value per Share. Within
sixty (60) days fallowing the close of each calendar year of the
Corporation, beginning with the calendar year ending December 31,
1993, or more frequently as they may determine, the stockholders
and the corporation shall in a writing signed by all of them
reaffirm the agreed value or agree upon a new value. In the event
that the stockholders and the Corporation fail either to reaffirm
the value per Share or agree upon a new value as of the end of any
fiscal year, the agreed value most recently fixed shall, subject to
adjustment pursuant to subsection (a), continue in effect for all
purposes.
13. Subchapter S Provisions.
The Corporation and each
Shareholder covenant and agree not to do any act or fail to do any
act, the commission or omission of which would voluntarily or
involuntarily cause the termination of the election of the
Corporation and the Shareholders under and pursuant to Subchapter
S (Sections 1361 through 1379 inclusive) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended. In the event of the violation of any
provision of this Section by the Corporation or any Shareholder,
the Shareholder who authorizes or causes such violation (whether in
his or her capacity as a stockholder, director, officer, employee
or agent for the Corporation or otherwise) shall be liable to the
Corporation and to the other stockholders for any damages,
liabilities or costs resulting directly or indirectly therefrom,
including, without limitation, any additional Federal income tax
liability of the other stockholders for any taxable year of such
other stockholders during which the Corporation's fiscal year ends
and the Corporation could have otherwise had an effective election
under Subchapter S; provided, however that no stockholder shall be
so liable if such stockholder acted in good faith and belief and
upon the advice of tax counsel that termination of the election
would not be caused thereby; and provided, further, that any
additional Federal income tax liability of other stockholders
resulting directly or indirectly from a violation of any provision
of this Section shall be computed by the independent certified
public accountant then servicing the Corporation and shall be
conclusive and binding upon all Parties for all purposes and in all
respects.
14. Legend? Transfers of Record. Upon execution of this
Agreement the certificates representing Shares of the Corporation
shall be surrendered to the Corporation and endorsed as follows:
"The Shares of Common Stock of Sole Source
Media, Inc., a Utah corporation represented by
this
certificate
are
subject
to
the
restrictions and options stated in, and are
transferable only upon compliance with, the
8
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provisions of an Agreement dated July 1, 1993,
by and among the various Shareholders and Sole
Source Media, Inc., a Utah corporation, a copy
of which is on file in the office of the
Secretary of Utah and will be supplied to any
Shareholder upon five (5) days prior written
notice, postage prepaid,"
After endorsement, the certificates shall be returned to the
Shareholders who shall, subject to the terms of this Agreement, be
entitled to exercise all rights of ownership of such Shares. All
certificates representing Shares of the Corporation from the date
hereof until the termination of the restrictions imposed by this
Agreement with respect to such Shares shall bear the same
endorsement. No Shares shall be transferred on the books of the
Corporation except upon compliance with the restrictions on
transfer contained in this Agreement.
15. Specific Performance. The Parties hereby declare that it
is impossible to measure in money the damages which will accrue to
a Party by reason of failure to perform any of the obligations of
or under this Agreement. Therefore, if any Party or the executor,
administrator or other legal representative of a deceased
Shareholder's estate shall institute any action or proceeding to
enforce the provisions hereof, any person
(including the
Corporation) against whom such action or proceeding is brought
hereby waives the claim or defense therein that such Party or such
legal representatives has or have an adequate remedy at law, and
such person shall not urge in any such action or proceeding the
claim or defense that such remedy at law exists.
16.

Miscellaneous.

(a) Any notice hereunder shall be personally delivered
or mailed by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, and
addressed to any Shareholder at his address as appearing in the
records of the Corporation and to the Corporation at its principal
office, or at such other address as may be specified by a Party to
the other Parties by notice given in the manner herein provided.
(b) No waiver by a Party hereto of a breach of any
provision of this Agreement shall be deemed to be a waiver of any
preceding or subsequent breach of the same or any other provision
hereof.
(c) This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the
State of Utah; it sets forth the entire Agreement among the Parties
concerning the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior
agreements and understandings relating to the subject matter
hereof; and any amendment or modification hereof will be effective
only if in writing and signed by the Parties affected thereby.
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(d) This Agreement shall bind and benefit the Parties
and their respective successors and legal representatives.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement
on the date first above written.
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC.

By

Donald Junowich * AT--*- ^ ' '

Its

President

r

/

Secretary

Kevin Stitt
AJ£.

William Morris

10
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ADDENDUM "D
NOTICE OF EXERCISE OF OPTION
AND SHAREHOLDERS ACTION
Dated December 5,1994

WTTKTi tif W¥AClSF'QF QWfON
Afff* W " " 1 0 1 1 1 " * ACTION

Decembers, 1994

Certified Mail

Brad Stewart
(Address in Company's records]
Provo,UT
Wtieren* dwrefcoldcxs of Sole Source Media, Inc. (the "Corporation") met on November
4,1994, at which meeting you and ail other shareholders were present, and shareholders owning
a majority of die total outstanding shares voted to terminate your employment as of November 4,
JW4, pursuant to Section 9* of that certain Employment Contract by and between you and the
Corporation, dated December !• 1993, and
Whereas a majority of the shareholders have consented to the adoption of a resolution for
the Corporation to exercise its option to purchase ail Three Hundred Thirty (330) of your
outstanding shares of the Corporation (a copy of the resolution is attached as Exhibit A to this
notice), pursuant to Paragraph 10(a) of thai certain Shareholders Agreement (the "Agreement")
dated July 1,1993, by andaaong the Corporation, Donald Junowich, Brad Stewart, Kevin Stitt
and William Morris, # the agreed Purchase Price of ONE DOLLA.% ($1.00) per share, oi * Wttd
of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY DOLLARS ($330.00) as provided in Paragraph 12 of the
Agreement,
Tnere&re, the Corporation hereby gives you notice of the resolution and action by drc
shareholders, and also hereby gives you notice of its exercise of the option to purchase your
shares pursuant to theteras of the Agreement You are therefore instructed to deliver the shares
to the Corporation, duly endorsed, no later than December 31,1994, at which time the
Corporation will tender payment in full, pursuant to Paragraph 10(c) of the Agreement.

SOLE SOURCE MEPIA, INC.

ItS:
ftocto*

TOTAL P.0*1

CONSENT OF SHAREHOLDERS
OF
SOLF, SOURCE MEDIA, INC.
The undersized being a majority of all the shareholders of Sole Source Media, Inc. (the
Corporat\on,t) Uo hereby consent to the adoption of the following resolution in accordance with
Section l6-I0a-704 of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act and Article 2, Section I \ of
the Coiporation's Bylaws:

,,

«T«rcing of Option to Parchine Share*
WHEREAS the employment of Brad Stewart was terminated, effective November 4,
1994, and
WHEREAS the terrnmation of the employment ?f Brad Stewart creates an option for the
Corporation to purchase all of the shares of the Corporation owned by Brad Stewart, pursuant to
that certain Shareholders Agreement, made as of July 1,1994, by and among the Corporation.
Donald Junowioh, 2?ad Stewart* Kpvin Stitt and William Morrio (tin "Agrwm*ntM),
BE XT THEREFORE RESOLVED, that the Corporation tfceK immediately exercise its
option, pursuant to th* Agreement, to purchase all of the Three Hundred Thirty (330) outstanding
shares of the Corporation owned by Brad Stewart, with demand for tender of the share
certificates to be made immediately and full payment of the Purchase Price of Three H-— 1 : Thirty Dollars (£330.00), as set by the Agreement, to be made upon tender of the share
certiacates or* or bvfoie December 51,1994.

2A22

mAKRHfa^m
Uon Junowiclt

SHARK
OWNED

PERCENT
OWNER

330 share*

33%

170*lwr«s

17%

170 shares

17%

[Aih

Wi&am E. Morris

HFC-0 1 "-1**1

3?

P.W

ADDENDUM "E"
MEETING MINUTES
Dated November 4,1994

MEETING OF SBUREHOLDF.RS
OF
SOLF SOURCE MEDIA, INC
The shareholders of ill of the outstanding shares of Sole Source Media, Inc. (the
"CoiporatiorO having met without objection, by telephone, on November 4,1994, having
therefore waived requirement of notice, the majority of all shareholders voted in favor of the
adoption of the following resolution in accordance with Article ?., Sections 3 and 4 of the
Corporation'* Bylaw*:

TenBJnatian of Brid Stewart
WHEREAS, Hrad Stewart has given the Corporation notice of his decision to
participate as a principal in another company in direct competition with the Corporation, which
participation is in violation of Sections 4, and 5 of the December 1,1993 Employment Contract
by and between Brad Stewart *nd the Corporation, therefore be it
RESOLVED, that the employment of Brad Stewart as Vice President of the
Corporation be terminated, effective November 4 4 1994 and that his salary and related benefits be
terminated as of tha! date.
SHARES

QSiUm

PERCENT

08BEESI

VOTE

SaAREiiCU?£B

For

Doa Juaowich

330 shares

33%

For

Kevin Sutt

t7Dsbar*$

17%

For

William £- Mocri*

170 shares

17%

Abstain

Brad Stewart

330 shores

33%

Kevin Stitt, Secretory

DEC-OS-1994

:?:?8

fitfnntz

ADDENDUM "F"
MEMO TO SOLE SOURCE SHAREHOLDERS
Dated December 12,1994

12/12/94

To:
Sole Source Shareholders
From: Brad Stewart
Following is an outline of issues which require discussion and resolution, pursuant to my
termination from Sole Source. Where applicable I have provided specific information
regarding the issue at hand. Other items arefistedpending the process of legal evaluation
andfinalnegotiation.
1, Car Lease Issue - The separation agreement dated and signed 11/4/94, allows
provision for the continued use of the leased auto. The agreement also specifies
that the full value of the remaining payments are to be paid by me in advance,
with a reimbursement allowance at the termination of the lease, contingent upon
mileage and the condition of the vehicle. It also stipulates that I provide and pay
for the insurance. Based on information I have received regarding the lease and the
insurance coverage I propose the following amended agreement.
Lease Payments: Brad Stewart is responsible for the lease value in excess of $300
monthly. Payments will be made quarterly and in advance. ( 3 payments) All maintenance
and repairs are the exclusive responsibility of Brad Stewart. Information received from
Chuck Barber at the Mitsubishi Dealership indicates the car is in the name of the
corporation with Don Junowich signing only as a "corporate guarantor" and therefore is
not exposed personally on the lease as was originally assumed In that I am currently a
shareholder with the same exposure as the other shareholders regarding the car leases
it seems inequitable to deposit the entire advance lease payment with Sole Source.
Until such time that we reach an agreement regarding payment of Q-2 dividends,
a releasefromthe bank loan liability, full reimbursement for 94 expenses, and interest
expense regarding my S30M CD collateral, I would extend the option for Sole Source
to deduct my share of the lease payment from those moneys owing. Please advise
if this is agreeable. Thefinalsubmission of expenses and interest expense is forthcoming.
Insurance: I accept the responsibility for thefinancialobligation regarding insurance
coverage. However, according to Wiseman Insurance, because the car is in the name
of the corporation, the policy must remain intact. It is perfectly legal and acceptable
to continue to list me as the primary driver, even though I am not an active employee
of the company. I do not have records regarding the annual premium value. Please
let me know the amount due and how you wish to handle payment.
2. Resolution to purchase shares. This offer is unacceptable based on the "valuation"
of stock value. Although I am agreeable to discuss a buyout, it willfirstbe necessary for
aO parties to agree to a posture of being fair and equitable. This offer falls way short.
3* Reimbursement of Expenses - According to ray records I have not submitted nor been

nn/ni

paid for any reimbursement of expenses incurred in 1994. If I am in error, please mail or
fax copies of validation of payment. In feet, please confirm either way. I am working on
thefinalexpense documentation. I think my last check for expenses was cut in January 94,
but for 1993 expenses.
4* Interest Due on Loan Collateral (S30M CB) I have requested Kamdar & Co. to
provide this billing for several months. This will reflect the difference between the interest
I collected from the bank and the rate of interest on the note. We're not talking a lot of
money here. I will forward upon receipt.
5.Access to financial Information. I have not received corporatefinancialinformation
for the Q*2 restatement or Q-3. I will need this information on a regular basis so long as I
continue as a shareholder. Please let me know when this information will be available.
6. Personal Guarantor - Vendor Accounts I am listed on several accounts as a personal
guarantor. I do not have accurate records which identity these specific vendors. I think
the list would include ZeHeibach, Lorraine, Dixon, Sun Utho, and possibly others. I
understand you have notified vendors ofmy termination and that I am no longer
authorized to purchase on behalf on Sole Source so I thought perhaps you could also
notify the vendors that I am no longer a valid personal guarantor on the account. If you
wish to decline to provide this notification please advise and I will proceed accordingly.
7. Payment of Dividends- Please furnish your proposed schedule for distribution of
dividends for the unpaid quarters. Also, please indicate the balance due my shares as of
the period ending September 30, 1994.
8. Valuation of Fixed Assets - As part of my separation agreement I was allowed to take
two computers and assume ownership of the fax machine. The fax machine developed a
malfunction with the thermal fusing bar and was taken to Lloyd's in Provo for repair. The
estimate for repair was in excess of the value of the machine. They gave me $75 credit
against a plain paper fax machine which I charged on a personal credit card. This was in
June of 1994. This purchase was and will not be submitted for reimbursement.
To prevent future conflict over division of fixed assets I suggest we establish a fair narket
value of the equipment that I acquired from Sole Source. Additionally, how do we address
the division of assets at the termination of the corporation, providing I am still a
shareholder? Do we then credit the value of the computers against that asset value?
9. Current stock value and Company worth - There are provisions in the shareholders
agreement with respect to valuation of the company. This valuation was to take place
annually, at the end of afiscalyear or calendar year. I do not have a current copy of die
corporate minutes which document this activity. If we are to begin constructive
discussion regarding a purchase of shares, it is a prerequisite to establish a value. It nay be
best to use the year ending 1994 as a basis for valuation. We also will need to reach m
agreement on who is to make the assessment and on what criteria. Please advise how you
plan to proceed with this activity.

SoleSourceMedia,3910 ra n g aSt..SuHeB. Salt Lake City, UT 84104 (801)972-6345 / (801) 972-6269 fax

ADDENDUM "G
AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN STITT
Dated February 27,1998
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GARY L. JOHNSON [A4353]
MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
KEVIN S T n T

PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Defendant and BRAD STEWART,
Defendants and Counterclaimant,

BRAD STEWART,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 950907433
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT,
Third-Party Defendants.
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STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF S ALT LAKE

)

I, KEVIN STITT, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:
1.

I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit, am over the

age of eighteen (18) years, and am otherwise competent to testify to the facts set forth herein.
2.

From July 1, 1993 through June 30, 1996, I was an officer, director, and

shareholder of Sole Source Media, Inc. ("Sole Source"). My office was that of secretary to the
corporation, and in that capacity I took minutes of shareholder meetings and kept records of the
corporation.
3.

From July 1, 1993 through 1994, Bradley K. Stewart ("Stewart") was also

an officer, director, and shareholder of Sole Source.
4.

On October 27, 1994, a shareholders' meeting at Sole Source was held to

consider a project from the Avery-Dennison Company ("Avery") known as "Communique." At the
meeting, the shareholders discussed discontinuing the Communique project, and also discussed
terminating the employment of Alane Anderson ("Anderson") and Anthony Dato ("Dato"), who
were employees of Sole Source with specific assignments on the Communique project.
5.

During the meeting, Stewart told the shareholders that if Sole Source was not

interested in pursuing Communique, Stewart would be interested in pursuing it on his own.
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6.

After Donald Junowich ("Junowich") left the October 27 meeting, Stewart

told William Morris ("Morris") and me that he could not work with Junowich and suggested that
we terminate Junowich.
7.

At sometime after the October 27 meeting, Stewart told me that he was

planning to open a new business with Anderson in order to handle the Communique project, and said
that I would have to choose between Junowich and Stewart.
8.

On November 4, 1994, another meeting of Sole Source shareholders was held

at Sole Source's principal corporate office. Donald Junowich participated by telephone. Stewart,
Morris, and I were all present. I took minutes of the meeting, and a true and correct copy of those
minutes is attached to the accompanying Memorandum as Exhibit "4."
9.

The November 4 meeting was called to consider removing Stewart because

he was forming a competing business. The meeting was called without prior notice. Stewart stated
no objection to the meeting being held or to the shareholders considering any agenda items.
10.

Junowich, Morris, and I all voted to remove Stewart as a member of the Board

of Directors, and also to remove him as an officer of Sole Source. Stewart abstained from each vote.
11.

The shareholders of Sole Source did not reaffirm the agreed value of a share

of stock in Sole Source at the end of 1993 or 1994, as contemplated in the Shareholders Agreement.
The shareholders also did not agree upon a new value at the end of 1993 or 1994.
12.

The certified public accountant then performing services for Sole Source

made no adjustment in the value per share at the end of 1993 or 1994.
3
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13.

When Sole Source was being formed as a corporation, and the Shareholders

Agreement was being prepared, the shareholders agreed that the value per share should be $1.00 in
order to discourage a shareholder from leaving Sole Source and starting a competing business.
DATED this tA

day of February, 1998.

KEVIN STITT
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

On the ^ 7 day of February, 1998, personally appeared before me, KEVIN STITT,
whose identity has been proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, being first duly sworn,
acknowledges that he executed the foregoing instrument, for the purposes stated therein, of his own
voluntary act.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

187517
sp:2/26/98
#13314-001

NOTARY PUBL!C
MICHAEL C. METTERS
734SLafc*$L

i»»0
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this ^ n< 4 day of-February, 1998, to the following:

PWcW
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC.
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff

a. rn,.n.„.:0
187517
sp:2/26/98
#13314-001
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ADDENDUM "H"
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM MORRIS
Dated February 27,1998

GARY L. JOHNSON [A4353]
MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
WILLIAM MORRIS

PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Defendant and BRAD STEWART,
Defendants and Counterclaimant,

BRAD STEWART,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs

Civil No. 950907433
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT,
Third-Party Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

I, WILLIAM MORRIS, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:
1.

I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit, am over the

age of eighteen (18) years, and am otherwise competent to testify to the facts set forth herein.
2.

From July 1, 1993 through June 30, 1996, I was an officer, director, and

shareholder of Sole Source Media, Inc. ("Sole Source").
3.

From July 1, 1993 through 1994, Bradley K. Stewart ("Stewart") was also

an officer, director, and shareholder of Sole Source.
4.

In August 1994, after some negotiation and correspondence with the

Avery-Dennison Company ("Avery"), Sole Source was notified that Avery would hire Sole Source
to be manager for a significant project known as "Communique."
5.

However, Avery delayed commencement of the Communique project, and

Sole Source ultimately determined it could not continue as project manager.
6.

At a meeting of Sole Source shareholders in later October 1994, the

shareholders discussed discontinuing the Communique project. We also discussed terminating the
employment of Alane Anderson ("Anderson") and Anthony Dato ("Dato"), who were the general
manager and lead coordinator, respectively, of the Communique project for Sole Source.
7.

At the meeting, Stewart said that if Sole Source did not want to pursue the

Communique project, Stewart may want to pursue it individually.
2
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8.

After Junowich left the meeting, Stewart told Kevin Stitt ("Stitt") and me that

he could not work with Junowich and that we should terminate Junowich.
9.

Within a few days after the October meeting, Stewart told me that he planned

to open a new business with Anderson to handle the Communique project, and said that I should
take control of the company and that we would be better off without Junowich.
10.

On November 4, 1994, another shareholders' meeting was called to consider

removing Stewart because he was forming a competing business. I voted in favor of Stewart's
termination as a member of the Board of Directors and as an officer of Sole Source, and Donald
Junowich ("Junowich") and Stitt also voted in favor of both proposals. Stewart abstained from each
vote.
11.

When the Shareholders Agreement was prepared, the shareholders agreed

upon a stock repurchase price of $1.00 per share in order to discourage a shareholder from leaving
and starting a competing business.
DATED this Z-n^hay of February, 1998.

Is
WILLIAM MORRIS

3
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STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

: ss.
)

On the *ZJ day of February, 1998, personally appeared before me, WILLIAM
MORRIS, whose identity has been proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, being first duly
sworn, acknowledges that he executed the foregoing instrument, for the purposes stated therein, of
his own voluntary act.

JTARYPUBLIC
JOTARY:
My Commission Expires:

til

^^

bioeo
NOTARY PUBLIC
^
MICHAEL C. METTERS
734SUJ»a.
^ . . a « M i » a » . U M i 84102
MycnmrtNiiii r u i n J m y %,zm
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument
was mailed,first-class,postage prepaid, on this^^j day of-February, 1998, to the following:
fOcrcK

Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC.
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff

187516
sp:2/27/98
#13314-001
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ADDENDUM "I"
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Dated December 14,1998

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

GARY L. JOHNSON [A4353]
MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant,
and Third-Party Defendants
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

DEC 1 * 1998
SALT LAKE COUNTY
^~"

Deputy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Defendant, and BRAD STEWART,
Defendant and Counterclaimant,

BRAD STEWART,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
Civil No. 950907433
vs.
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT,

Judge William W. Barrett

Third-Party Defendants.
This matter came before the Court as previously scheduled on July 1, 1998, on
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("MPSJ"), before the Honorable William W.

Barrett of the Third Judicial District Court at 450 South State Street, Courtroom W35, Salt Lake
City, Utah. The Plaintiff was present through its officers William Morris and Kevin Stitt and was
represented by its counsel Matthew C. Barneck of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson.

The

Defendant Brad Stewart was present and represented by his counsel Jeflfrey L. Silvestrini, Esq. of
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal.
The Court issued its ruling on the Plaintiffs MPSJ on September 2, 1998 (the
"Ruling"), and subsequently entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment
consistent with its Ruling on October 13, 1998. However, because the Court signed those
documents without reviewing the Defendant's Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dated October 2, 1998, the Defendant then filed a Motion to Vacate Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment dated October 19, 1998. Accordingly, the Court
entered an Order Vacating Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment dated
November 9, 1998.
The Ruling only disposed of Plaintiffs MPSJ and did not rule upon three (3)
outstanding discovery Motions which were also briefed and argued at the same time as the Plaintiffs
MPSJ. Those Motions include Defendant's Motion to Compel Production of Documents, Plaintiffs
Motion for Protective Order, and Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents. Because
the parties could not agree upon a resolution of those Motions following the Court's Ruling on the
MPSJ, Plaintiff filed a Request for Further Ruling dated October 19, 1998, seeking the Court's
ruling on those discovery Motions.
2

Defendant thenfileda Motion for New Trial/Reconsideration of Summary Judgment
dated October 23, 1998 asking the Court to reconsider its Ruling on Plaintiffs MPSJ. That Motion
was fully briefed with a Memorandum in Opposition from the Plaintiff and a Reply Memorandum
from the Defendant.
On Tuesday, November 17, 1998, the Court held a further hearing to consider
(1) Defendant's Motion for New Trial/Reconsideration and (2) Plaintiffs Request for Further
Ruling. The Plaintiff was again present through its officers William Morris and Kevin Stitt and was
represented by its counsel of record Matthew C. Barneck of RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON. The Defendant Brad Stewart was represented by his counsel Jeffrey L. Silvestrini of
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL. The Court has received and reviewed the memoranda of the
parties and heard oral argument on all pending matters, and now enters the following Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Sole Source Media, Inc. ("Sole Source") was a Utah corporation

which conducted business as a graphics management company, in which Donald Junowich
("Junowich"), William Morris ("Morris"), Kevin Stitt ("Stitt"), and Brad Stewart ("Stewart")
were shareholders. Sole Source dissolved automatically by the terms of its articles of incorporation
on June 30, 1996.
2.

Stewart also was an officer and director of Sole Source.

3

00586

3.

All the shareholders, including Stewart, signed a Shareholders Agreement

dated July 1, 1993 (the "Shareholders Agreement"). Paragraph 10(a) of the Shareholders
Agreement gave Sole Source the option to re-purchase all of Stewart's shares in the event his
employment was terminated "for any reason other than death . . .." (Shareholders Agreement,
110(a.)
4.

Stewart also entered an employment contract dated December 1, 1993 (the

"Employment Contract"), which provided that "Employee shall not, during the term hereof, be
interested directly or indirectly, in any manner, [as a] partner, officer, stockholder, advisor,
employee or in any other capacity in any other business of the type an [sic] character of business
engaged in by Employer, or any allied trade . . .." (Employment Contract, ^ 5.)
5.

Paragraph 9e. of the Employment Contract provides that it may be terminated

upon the employee's breach of the agreement. Paragraph 9.d. of the Employment Contract also
provides that it "may be terminated by Employer on thirty (30) days written notice to Employee."
(Employment Contract, % 9.)
6.

In August 1994, Sole Source was notified by the Avery-Denison Company

("Avery") that Avery would hire Sole Source to be manager for a significant project known as
"Communique." At a subsequent meeting of the Sole Source shareholders on October 27, 1994,
however, the shareholders discussed discontinuing the Communique project. "Stewart stated that
if Sole Source did resign the Avery Project, he might be interested in pursuing it individually."
(Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint,fflf23-25.) Stewart later informed Morris and Stitt that
4
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the Avery Project was worthwhile and should be pursued by Sole Source. Stewart said that if Avery
was unwilling to work with Junowich, a new company might be structured alongside Sole Source
in order to facilitate the project. (Stewart Aff,fflf21-24.)
7.

On November 4, 1994, a Sole Source shareholders meeting was held to

consider terminating Stewart. Stewart did not object to the meeting being held. Although it is
disputed whether Stewart abstained or voted against the proposal, it is undisputed that Junowich,
Morris, and Stitt each voted to terminate Stewart's employment.
8.

Stewart now owns and operates Defendant Prologic, Inc., which was

established in December 1994 as a competitor of Sole Source.
9.

On November 4, 1994, Junowich, Morris, and Stitt each signed a notice "to

all Sole Source media employees" announcing the termination of Brad Stewart (the "Termination
Notice").

On the same date, Morris signed a "Separation Agreement" (the "Separation

Agreement") which recited that Stewart had been terminated as an employee of Sole Source, and
provided certain severance benefits including one month's salary and continued use of a corporate
automobile. Stewart acknowledges receiving the Termination Notice on or about November 4,
1994. (Affidavit of Brad Stewart, ^ 4.) In a memorandum from Stewart to the Sole Source
shareholders dated December 12, 1994 (the "Stewart Memorandum"), Stewart acknowledged "my
termination from Sole Source."

5
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10.

On November 7, 1994, Sole Source shareholders Morris and Stitt signed an

agreement (the "Waiver Agreement") with Stewart waiving the non-compete provision of the
Employment Contract with respect to Avery. The stated intent of the Waiver Agreement to allow
Stewart to pursue the Avery business without violating the Employment Contract.
11.

On December 5, 1994, Sole Source sent to Stewart by certified mail a '"Notice

of Exercise of Option and Shareholders Action" (the "Option Notice") which notified Stewart that
Sole Source was exercising its option to purchase Stewart's shares pursuant to the Shareholders
Agreement. The Option Notice also tendered the purchase price of one dollar per share or a total
of $330.00. The Option Notice instructed Stewart to deliver the shares to Sole Source duly endorsed
no later than December 31, 1994, at which time Sole Source would tender payment in full. Stewart
received the Option Notice and tender of purchase price but has failed and refused to surrender the
shares. (Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, ^ 63.) By the Stewart Memorandum, Stewart
rejected the tendered purchase price.
12.

The Shareholders Agreement states the purchase price to be paid upon

exercise of the repurchase option. Paragraph 12(a)(ii) provides that:
the Purchase Price shall be the "agreed value" determined in
accordance with subsection (b) subject to adjustment by the
independent certified public accountant then serving the Corporation
to reflect material events and changes in circumstances occurring
subsequent to the date on which the agreed value was last fixed.
(Shareholders Agreement, f 12(a).)
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13.

Paragraph 12(b) provides that "the 'agreed value5 per share as of the date of

this Agreement is one dollar ($1). This price has been agreed upon by the Corporation and the
Shareholders as representing the fair value per Share." (Shareholders Agreement, % 12(b).)
14.

Paragraph 12(b) also provides that within sixty (60) days following the close

of a calendar year:
the stockholders and the Corporation shall in a writing signed by all
of them reaffirm the agreed value or agree upon a new value. In the
event that the stockholders and the Corporation fail either to reaffirm
the value per Share or agree upon a new value as of the end of any
fiscal year, the agreed value most recently fixed shall, subject to
adjustment pursuant to subsection (a), continue in effect for all
purposes.
(Shareholders Agreement, ^ 12(b).)
15.

The agreed value was never adjusted by any independent certified public

accountant serving the Corporation, and neither Stewart, Junowich, Morris, nor Stitt requested such
an adjustment in the ordinary course of business. In the Stewart Memorandum, among other things,
Stewart suggested that the shares of the corporation be revalued.

However, the Stewart

memorandum was sent after his termination. No revaluation of the shares was undertaken based
upon Stewart's suggestion or for any other reason.
16.

The shareholders and Sole Source did not agree in writing or otherwise to

reaffirm the agreed value per share or establish a new value, as provided for in paragraph 12(b) of
the Shareholders Agreement.
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17.

The Affidavits of William Morris and Kevin Stitt submitted with Plaintiffs

MPSJ establish that, when Sole Source was formed as a corporation, the shareholders set the agreed
value at $1.00 per share in order to discourage a shareholder from leaving and starting a competing
business. No other extrinsic evidence was submitted by any party bearing upon the interpretation
of paragraph 12 of the Shareholders Agreement.
18.

At the hearing on November 17, 1998, the parties stipulated to a partial

resolution of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents. The parties agreed that
pursuant to Request No. 9 of Plaintiffs Request for Production of Documents, the parties will
engage in a comparison of customer lists to determine if Stewart serviced any other customers
following his termination in violation of his employment contract with Sole Source. If any such
customers are identified, the Defendant Stewart agreed to produce documentation relating to his
work for those customers including any financial information relating to earnings from those
customers. All other issues in Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents were
reserved.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the following
Conclusions of Law.
1.

Sole Source properly terminated Stewart's employment under paragraph 9.e.

because Stewart breached the employment contract by announcing his desire to pursue the Avery
business. A majority of Sole Source shareholders voted at the November 4, 1994 shareholders
meeting to terminate Stewart's employment. A unanimous decision was not required to terminate
Stewart's employment under the Employment Contract.
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2.

Sole Source and Stewart subsequently entered the Waiver Agreement on

November 7, 1994 allowing Stewart to pursue the Avery contract, which was based upon Stewart's
termination three (3) days earlier. Moreover, Stewart acknowledged in the Waiver Agreement that
he would be pursuing the Avery Business under a "new company, yet un-named."
3.

By attending and participating in the November 4, 1994 shareholders meeting,

Stewart waived any right to object to the meeting being held.
4.

Sole Source also properly terminated Stewart's employment under paragraph

9.d. of the Employment Contract. Sole Source gave Stewart the functional equivalent of thirty (30)
days notice by giving him one month salary as a severance benefit and continued use of the
corporate vehicle, as provided in the Separation Agreement. Therefore, Sole Source substantially
complied with paragraph 9.d. of the Employment Contract.
5.

Sole Source properly exercised its repurchase option under the Shareholders

Agreement by the Option Notice which Stewart received and to which he responded. The purchase
price Sole Source tendered was proper under the Shareholders Agreement. The agreed value under
the Shareholders Agreement remained at one dollar ($1.00) per share as of December 1994.
6.

Neither Sole Source nor its shareholders requested an independent certified

public accountant to adjust the agreed value, nor were they required to do so under the Shareholders
Agreement. The language "subject to adjustment" as contained in Paragraphs 12(a)(ii) and 12(b)
of the Shareholders Agreement was permissive in nature and not mandatory, such that neither Sole
Source nor its shareholders were required to engage a certified public accountant to adjust the agreed
value per share.
9
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7.

Additionally, neither Sole Source nor its shareholders agreed in writing to

reafiBrm the agreed value or establish a new value as provided for in Paragraph 12(b), and therefore
when Sole Source exercised its repurchase option the agreed value remained at one dollar ($1.00)
per share for all purposes.
8.

Stewart's refusal to accept the tendered purchase price and to return his shares

were a breach of the Shareholders Agreement. The Shareholders Agreement may be specifically
enforced by its own terms (Shareholders Agreement, <[| 15) and under Utah law. Because the
Shareholders Agreement contained a clear method for determining the purchase price, the parties
intended that Sole Source's exercise of the repurchase option would terminate Stewart's status as
a shareholder as of December 31, 1994, the date on which the Option Notice requested Stewart to
surrender his shares and as of which the purchase price was tendered.
9.

Accordingly, Stewart's status as a shareholder was terminated as of

December 31, 1994. Stewart has no standing to assert claims against Sole Source, Junowich,
Morris, or Stitt for any events or actions occurring after December 31, 1994. Therefore, the First,
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Causes of Action in Stewart's Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint
should be dismissed as a matter of law and with prejudice, and the Sixth Cause of Action also should
be dismissed to the extent it alleges wrongful conduct and/or seeks legal remedies based upon
actions or events occurring after December 31, 1994.
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10.

Stewart's Second Cause of Action seeking judicial dissolution of Sole source

because of alleged "oppression of a minority shareholder" should be dismissed as a matter of law
and with prejudice because the claim is moot, since Sole Source dissolved on June 30, 1996 by the
terms of its own articles of incorporation.
11.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to

Compel Production of Documents because it seeks discovery relating to time periods after
December 31, 1994, which items are not discoverable given the termination of Stewart's status as
shareholder on that date. For the same reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order is granted.
12.

Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of Documents is granted in part

based upon the stipulation of the parties with regard to Request No. 9. The Court reserves ruling
on all other issues raised in the Motion.
DATED this

r\

( 4 day ofNfe^&«<l998.
BY THE COURT:

HONO
THIRD
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
/ /

COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL

JEFFREY L. SJJLVESTRINI
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
mailed,first-class,postage prepaid, on this ~*,01^ day of November, 1998, to the following:
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC.
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Attorneys for Defendants

(W«rw j

J^CWVHJ

216221
#13314-001
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ADDENDUM "J"
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Dated December 14,1998

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
GARY L. JOHNSON [A4353]
MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant,
and Third-Party Defendants
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

DEC 1 * 1998
SALT LAKE COUNTY
By
Deputy Cleric

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,
vs.
PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Defendant, and BRAD STEWART,
Defendant and Counterclaimant,

JUDGMENT
and
ORDER

BRAD STEWART,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
Civil No. 950907433

vs.
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT,

Judge William W. Barrett

Third-Party Defendants.
This matter came before the Court as previously scheduled on July 1, 1998, on
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and also on Defendant's Motion to Compel
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Production of Documents, Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order, and Plaintiffs Motion to Compel
Production of Documents, before the Honorable William W. Barrett of the Third Judicial District
Court at 450 South State Street, Courtroom W35, Salt Lake City, Utah. The Plaintiff was present
through its officers William Morris and Kevin Stitt and was represented by its counsel Matthew C.
Barneck of RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON. The Defendant Brad Stewart was
present and represented by his counsel Jeffrey L. Silvestrini of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL.
For reasons detailed in the accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
the Court held a further hearing in this matter on Tuesday, November 17, 1998 to consider
Defendant's Motion for New Trial/Reconsideration of Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Request
for Further Ruling. The Court received and reviewed the memoranda of the parties, heard oral
argument on all pending matters, and has entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of this
same date. Based upon the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as
follows:
1.

Defendant Brad Stewart's status as a shareholder of Sole Source Media, Inc.

was terminated on December 31, 1994 by Sole Source's proper exercise of its stock repurchase
option, as detailed in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
2.

The First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Causes of Action of Brad Stewart's

Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint shall be and are hereby dismissed as a matter of law and
with prejudice, and the Sixth Cause of Action also is dismissed to the extent it alleges wrongful
conduct and/or seeks legal remedies based upon actions or events occurring after December 31,
1994.
2

3.

The Second Cause of Action of Stewart's Counterclaim and Third-Party

Complaint is also dismissed as a matter of law and with prejudice because it is moot, based upon
Sole Source's earlier dissolution under the terms of its articles of incorporation.
4.

Defendant's Motion to Compel Production of Documents is denied.

5.

PlaintifFs Motion for Protective Order is granted, and Plaintiffs Motion to

Compel Production of Documents is granted in part based upon a stipulation of the parties. The
Court reserves ruling on all other issues raised in Plaintiffs Motion to compel Production of
Documents.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL

JEFFREY L. SILVESTRINI
Attorneys for Defendants
3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 30t!Lday of November, 1998, to the following:
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC.
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Attorneys for Defendants

P^x,-^ / ivu i\-.: 0
216255
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ADDENDUM "K"
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO COMPEL
Dated April 26,1999

APR 2 a r - n
By

* " w e COUNT

MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant,
and Third-Party Defendants
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,
ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL

vs.
PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Defendant and BRAD STEWART,
Defendants and Counterclaimant,

BRAD STEWART,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

Civil No. 950907433

vs.
Judge William W. Barrett
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT,
Third-Party Defendants.
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This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel dated
March 19, 1998. The Motion was fully briefed and first argued before the Court on July 1, 1998,
along with two (2) other discovery Motions and a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The
Court's ruling issued September 2, 1998 addressed only the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
A subsequent hearing was held on November 17, 1998, and following that the Court
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment and Order each dated
December 14, 1998. Those Orders addressed the other discovery Motions but reserved ruling on
the Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, except with regard to Request No. 9 as to which the parties
reached a stipulation.
Plaintiff then filed a subsequent Request for Further Ruling dated March 17, 1999
with regard to Request Nos. 4 through 8 of the Plaintiff's First Request for Production of
Documents, as addressed in the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. This Court issued its Ruling on
April 12, 1999 granting the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel with respect to Request Nos. 4 through 8.
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel is granted with respect to Request Nos. 4

through 8 of Plaintiff's First Request for Production of Documents.
2.

The documents requested shall be produced within tldrty (30) days of this

Order.
DATED this <^£?day of April, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
2
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC.

L. SILVESTRINI
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed,
first-class, postage prepaid, on this 3.3 nA day of April, 1999, to the following:
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC.
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM "L"
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Dated July 13,1999

fcsasasr
"Strict

MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant,
and Third-Party Defendants
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Defendant and BRAD STEWART,
Defendants and Counterclaimant,

BRAD STEWART,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
Civil No. 950907433
vs.
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT,
Third-Party Defendants.

Judge William W. Barrett

This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorney
Fees. The Court has received and reviewed that Motion along with the accompanying Memorandum
in Support and the Affidavit of Matthew C. Barneck, each of which were dated April 23, 1999. The
Court also received and reviewed Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Award of Attorney fees dated May 10, 1999, and Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Award of Attorney Fees dated May 18, 1999. The Court then issued its ruling by
disposition summary dated June 7, 1999.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court now enters the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds the following facts in relation to the Plaintiffs Motion for Award
of Attorney Fees:
1.

Defendants' Counterclaim alleged certain causes of action based upon an

Employment Contract dated December 1, 1993 between Defendant Brad K. Stewart ("Stewart") and
Plaintiff Sole Source Media, Inc. ("Sole Source"), including claims for declaratory judgment, breach
of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
2.

By a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated March 3, 1998 (the

"MPSJ"), Sole Source sought the dismissal of those and other causes of action in the Counterclaim.
3.

Through a series of rulings detailed in Plaintiffs Memorandum, the Court

granted the MPS J and ultimately entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment
and Order dated December 14, 1998.

2
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4.

The Employment Contract contains the following provision regarding the

recovery of attorney fees:
In the event that any action isfiledin relation to this Contract,
the unsuccessful party in the action shall pay to the successful party,
in addition to all the sums that either party may be called upon to pay,
a reasonable sum for the successful party's attorneys' fees.
(Employment Contract, 1f 16.)
5.

The parties alsofileda series of discovery Motions including the following:
a.

Plaintiffs Motion to Compel dated March 19, 1998.

b.

Defendants' Motion to Compel Production of
Documents dated February 3, 1998.

c.

Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order dated
February 13, 1998.

Those Motions were briefed and heard by the Court as detailed in the Plaintiffs Memorandum.
6.

The Court ruled in favor of Sole Source and the Third-Party Defendants on

all of those Motions.
7.

In pursuing the MPSJ and in pursuing and defending the discovery Motions,

Sole Source and the Third-Party Defendants incurred attorney fees of $8,394.85 and costs of
$367.82, for a total of $8,762.67. The attorney fees are based upon the number of hours worked and
the rates charged as identified in the AflSdavit of Matthew C. Barneck,ffij4-8. The costs incurred
are itemized in ^ 9 of the AflSdavit.
8.

The Affidavit of Matthew C. Barneck adequately and properly identifies the

specific work performed in relation to the MPSJ and the discovery Motions, as shown infflf4-6 of
3
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the Affidavit. The Affidavit also fairly allocates and categorizes the proportion of fees relating to
the MPS J that were incurred to obtain a dismissal of claims "in relation to" the Employment
Contract.
) A Nsf*

^'

DefendantS^pcgsented no opposing evidence re gnrriinp; the nth M IH y l< J , ,iinl '
aa<B 55a!a sa a

costsjoyghUirtte

^
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court now

makes the following Conclusions of Law with regard to the Plaintiffs

Motion for Award of Attorney Fees.
1.

The portions of the Counterclaim identified in the Findings No. 1 above

constitute an action in relation to the Employment Contract. Sole Source was the successfiil party
and Stewart was the unsuccessful party in that action, as contemplated in TJ16

of the Employment

Contract. Accordingly, the Court concludes that an award of fees and costs to Sole Source is
appropriate.
2.

With respect to each of the discovery Motions identified in the Findings of

Fact above, Sole Source was the prevailing party and Stewart was the losing party as contemplated
by Rule 37(aX4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court concludes that Stewart's pursuit
and defense of those Motions was not substantially justified and that no other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust. Accordingly, the Court concludes that an award of fees and expenses
to Sole Source and Third-Party Defendants is appropriate.
3.

Considering the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in

presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, fees customarily
4
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charged in the Salt Lake City area for similar services, the amount involved in the case and the
results attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved, the Court concludes that
the amount of attorney fees and costs Plaintiff seeks is reasonable. Specifically, the Court concludes
that the amount and type of work performed was reasonable given the nature of the case, and that
the rates charged by the Plaintiff's counsel were reasonable.
4.

The Court concludes that Defendant Stewart should pay to Sole Source and

Third-Party Defendants $8,394.85 in attorney fees and $367.82 in costs, for a total of $8,762.67.

DATED this f O day tfj&ASq&W.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC.

JEFFREY L. SHVESTRINI
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
mailed,first-class,postage prepaid, on this J / jj-day of June, 1999, to the following:
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT& SEGAL, PC.
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff
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257211
bjm:6/21/99
#13314-001
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ADDENDUM "M"
ORDER AWARDING
ATTORNEY FEES
Dated July 13,1999

MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant,
and Third-Party Defendants
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,
ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES
vs.
PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Defendant and BRAD STEWART,
Defendants and Counterclaimant,

BRAD STEWART,
Civil No. 950907433
Third-Party Plaintiff,
Judge William W. Barrett

vs.
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT,
Third-Party Defendants.
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This matter came before the Court on the Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorney
Fees dated April 23, 1999.

The Court considered the Plaintiffs Motion, its supporting

Memorandum, and the Affidavit of Matthew C. Barneck, as well as the Defendants' Memorandum
in Opposition and the Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum. The Court issued its ruling without a hearing
by a Disposition Summary dated June 7, 1999, and granted the Plaintiffs Motion for Award of
Attorney Fees. The Court further has entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of this same
date.
Based up the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS that Defendant Brad K. Stewart
shall pay to the Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants $8,394.85 in attorney fees and $367.82 in costs,
for a sum total of $8,762.67. That amount shall be paid within thirty (30) days after entry of this
Order.

It

DATED this I *+* day <
BY THE COURTS

HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC.

JEFFREY L. SELVESTRINI
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
mailed,first-class,postage prepaid, on this ^ / ^ d a y of June, 1999, to the following:
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC.
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM "N"
AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW C. BARNECK
Dated April 23,1999

MATTHEW C. BARNECK [A5249]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Counterclaim Defendant,
and Third-Party Defendants
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SOLE SOURCE MEDIA, INC., a Utah
Corporation, Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,
AFFIDAVIT OF
MATTHEW C. BARNECK

vs.
PROLOGIC, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Defendant and BRAD STEWART,
Defendants and Counterclaimant,

BRAD STEWART,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

Civil No. 950907433

vs.
Judge William W. Barrett
DONALD JUNOWICH, WILLIAM
MORRIS and KEVIN STITT,
Third-Party Defendants.
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

I, MATTHEW C. BARNECK, being first duly sworn depose and state as follows:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and otherwise competent to testify

to the facts set forth in this Affidavit.
2.

I am a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar Association and have

been since 1988, and have been continuously engaged in the practice of law in the State of Utah
since 1988. I am also a member in good standing of the Colorado State Bar Association since 1996.
3.

I have been the principal attorney representing Plaintiff Sole Source Media,

Inc. ("Sole Source") and Third-Party Defendants William Morris ("Morris"), Kevin Stitt ("Stitt"),
and Donald Junowich ("Junowich") in this matter.
4.

In pursuing Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and defending against Stewart's

Motion to Compel including the accompanying Motion for Protective Order, Plaintiff and
Third-Party Defendants have incurred the following fees and costs:

Description of Work
Attorney
Matthew C. Barneck
Brett L. Tolman
(law clerk)
Cheri K. Gochberg
(law clerk)

Legal research to prepare Motion for
Protective Order, Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion to Compel, and
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel; draft each of
those Motions and Memoranda; evaluate
Defendant's responses to each; legal research
for and drafting of Reply Memoranda in
Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Protective
Order and Motion to Compel; draft Request
for Further Ruling on Discovery Motions.

Total

No. of
Hours

Amount of
Fees/Costs

28.0
4.8

$2,304.10
264.00

4.5

247.50

37,3

$2,815.60 1

2
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5.

In pursuing the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on behalf of Sole

Source, Morris, Stitt, and Junowich, the following work was done and attorney fees incurred:
Description of Work
Attorney
Matthew C. Barneck

Legal research to prepare Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment; draft Motion,
Memorandum, and supporting Affidavits;
evaluate Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition; legal research for and drafting of
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment; prepare Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment
and Order, to implement Court's September 2,
1998 ruling; legal research for and drafting of
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
1 Motion for Reconsideration/New Trial.

No. of Amount of
Hours Fees/Costs
36.3

$4,489.50

For reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, Sole Source seeks an award
of at leastfiftypercent (50%) of these fees related to its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, in
a precise amount to be determined by the Court. Fifty percent (50%) of that amount equals
$2,244.75.
6.

Much of the work on behalf of Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants was done

to pursue or defend all of the four (4) motions described above and cannot be segregated feasibly.
In that regard, the following work was done and the following fees incurred:
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Description of Work
Attorney
Prepare for July 1, 1998 hearing on all motions
including preparation of exhibits, hearing
binders, and outline for oral argument; attend
hearing and argue all four (4) Motions;
prepare for and attend November 17, 1998
hearing on Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration/New Trial and Objections to
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
on Plaintiffs Request for Further Ruling re
discovery motions; further preparation of final
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment and Order; prepare Motion for
1 Attorney Fees.
7.

Matthew C. Barneck

No. of
Hours
24.7

Amount of
Fees/Costs
$3,334.50

Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants have also incurred the following costs

in connection with the work described above:
Type of Cost

$102.70 1

Photocopies

[

Amount

Electronic legal research

155.43 1

Hearing exhibits and hearing binders

109.69

Total

$367.82
8.

The total amount of fees and costs incurred in connection with these Motions,

for which an award is sought, is at least the following:
$ 8,394.85
367.82

Total fees:
Total costs:
GRAND TOTAL
9.

$ 8.762.67

The work described above and the amount of hours spent performing that

work were reasonable and necessary given the nature of the case, the claims alleged by Defendant

4

00652

and Third-Party Plaintiff, and the complexity of the facts and legal issues involved. The rates
charged for Matthew C. Barneck rangefrom$110.00 to $135.00 per hour over the span of the nearly
two (2) years time during which the work was performed. The rate for law clerks Brett L. Tolman
and Cheri K. Gochberg was $55.00. Those rates are reasonable and comparable to the rates of other
attorneys and law clerks in the Salt Lake County, Utah, area with similar experience in similar cases.
10.

The description above of work performed, including the number of hours and

the amount of fees and costs incurred, is the result of a careful review of billings over the past two
(2) years. The majority of the total fees and costs actually incurred by Plaintiff and Third-Party
Defendants in this action have not been included in this Affidavit, but only those which directly
relate to the motions identified above on which Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants have been the
prevailing parties. With regard to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Sole Source only
seeks fees for the approximate portion of that work which related to the Employment Contract.
DATED this ^ 3 day of April, 1999.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

On the 2 3 day of April, 1999, personally appeared before me, MATTHEW C.
BARNECK, whose identity has been proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, beingfirstduly
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sworn, acknowledges that he executed the foregoing instrument, for the purposes stated therein, of
his own voluntary act.

NOTARY PUBLIC

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

SANDRA PRIONS
1697 North 120OMM
CftmUWlMOIS
MyG3mmalonE>0NiMKl>aoa4
stmofUM

r/w./ *. zoo?
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
mailed,first-class,postage prepaid, on this 2 3 ^ day of April, 1999, to the following:

Jeffrey L. Silvestrini, Esq.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, PC.
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff
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